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ABSTRACT
THE FISCAL THEORY OF THE PRICE LEVEL IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
A STRUCTURAL BREAK ANALYSIS
CHRISTIAN TCHAMDA
2017
In this paper, I provide empirical evidence of the fiscal theory of the price level
(FTPL) using sub-Saharan African countries. While the traditional view of the inflation is
driven and explained by the quantity theory of money, the FTPL argues that the
government deficit has an impact on the price level. However, the empirical literature of
the FTPL is not extensive. This paper adds to this literature in that it substantiates this
theory. I determine using primary balance and liabilities data when available to classify a
country as under either a monetary dominant regime (the traditional view) or under a
fiscally dominant regime (FTPL). Additionally, using the inflation data from these
countries I perform a structural break analysis to determine whether a country
experienced a significant change in regime between 1980 and 2005. I find that the U.S.
immediately after World War II experienced a period that had the characteristics of a
fiscally dominant regime. I also find that after the Accord of 1951, the regime switched to
a monetary regime because the structural break analysis of the U.S inflation data detects a
significant break year in 1952. In sub-Saharan African countries, Kenya switched from a
monetary dominant regime to a fiscally dominant regime after 1994, its structural break
year.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
There are many factors that explain the gap between developed and developing
economies. Socially, developing economies have a higher percentage of illiterates.
Politically, they usually have unofficial dictatorships. And economically they have less
sophisticated financial systems. Sub-Saharan Africa is characterized by higher inflation
rates. Between 1980 and 2005, CFA countries had an annual average inflation rate of 5.4
4 percent, non-CFA countries with a fixed exchange rate had an annual average inflation
rate of 8.9 percent, and countries with a floating exchange rate had an annual average
inflation rate of 26.2 percent. The fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) is another
explanation for this gap. While the mainstream view of inflation is the monetarist view,
FTPL argues that there is also a fiscal aspect to it. In other words, inflation can be
explained by two processes: the quantity theory of money and the fiscal theory of the
price level. My thesis focuses on the second process and shows that this process may
explain inflation in developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan African (SSA)
countries.
The monetary view of inflation is that creation of money is the source of inflation.
This view assumes central bank independence and solvency of the government debt. In
other words, in a country where there is both fiscal and monetary discipline, money
creation is generally the explanation for inflation. However, this process of inflation is
not the only one. In countries that do not have an independent central bank, or a
sophisticated financial system, the FTPL may provide a better understanding of inflation.
My paper adds to the empirical literature that provides evidence of this theory.
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Statement of the problem
There is a problem of observational equivalence when looking for an explanation
for inflation. Both the monetarist view and the FTPL assumes the government
intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied, but the reasons why differ. As a result,
empirical evidence of the FTPL is not extensive. While Leeper (2012) proposes a
theoretical reason why the FTPL is plausible, he admits that the empirical evidence is not
easily attainable. Ribeiro and Baldini (2008), however, show using sub-Saharan countries
can be used for empirical evidence because of their economic history. That is, because
most sub-Saharan African countries have monetary and financial systems that are not yet
fully developed, they are likely to have experienced the FTPL since they became
independent.
Objectives of the Study
Adding to Ribeiro and Baldini’s study, I use the same countries to show that there
is evidence of FTPL in that part of the world. Additionally, I use the criteria given by
Canzonery et al. (2001) to show that these countries have gone through regime switches
during the period 1980 to 2005. Specifically, I use a vector-autoregression approach if
there are sufficient data. If there are insufficient data to use this approach, I use a
historical interpretation to argue for either a fiscally or monetary dominant regime.
Therefore, my overall objective is to add to the body of literature that supports the FTPL.
Specifically, my goal is to show that many countries in sub-Saharan African have gone
through regime switches between 1980 and 2005, and hence give evidence of the FTPL.
Additionally, I use this structural break analysis to show that the US also went through a
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period of transition, and switched regime during its history. Therefore, my hypotheses are
the following:
H0: The US switched regime after the Accord of March 1951
H0: There is a switch in regime in multiple sub-Saharan countries during the
period 1980 to 2005
Significance of the Study
This study will add to the existing body of literature on the relationship between
fiscal policy and monetary policy in sub-Saharan African countries. Additionally, it will
provide evidence of regime switches before, during, or after periods of war in developing
economies. Furthermore, it will provide policymakers, particularly in the SSA nations I
analyze in this study, with historical examples of good and bad monetary or fiscal policy
decisions. This could provide them with a tool that could help them analyze their own
monetary aggregates, and know when the source of inflation is changing in their country.

4

Chapter 2: Literature Review
Traditionally, inflation has been regarded as a purely monetary phenomenon. In
fact, according to Milton Friedman, “inflation is always and everywhere a monetary
phenomenon.” (Friedman 1963, p. 17). It is true that the core mission of a central bank is
to achieve price stability, with which central bankers around the globe are primarily
concerned. Nevertheless, the (relatively new) fiscal theory of the price level (hereafter,
FTPL) challenges this view. The mainstream view of inflation is based on two important
propositions, according to Woodford (2001). The first proposition is that fiscal policy is
of little consequence to inflation determination, and the second is that monetary policy
has little effect upon the government budget. The major industrial nations usually
consider the fiscal effects of monetary policy as an afterthought because seigniorage
revenues are such a small fraction of their total government revenues. Woodford points
out, however, that such an argument ignores a more important channel of fiscal effects on
monetary policy; namely, the effects of monetary policy on the real value of outstanding
government debt, which the government issues in nominal terms. He argues that fiscal
policy can affect the price level (given that much of the public debt is nominal), the price
of bonds, and the real debt burden.

2.1 Types of Regimes
Inflation is always a monetary phenomenon in a so-called Ricardian regime. A
Ricardian regime, also known as a monetary dominant regime, assumes the fiscal
authority sets primary surpluses in order to ensure fiscal solvency. In other words, fiscal
disturbances on private sector budget constraints are neutralized by the existence of
rational expectations and frictionless markets. That is, even though in traditional
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economic models, a bond-financed tax raises consumption, the Ricardian view of
consumption has a different implication. For example, Romer (2012) alludes to the
United States tax cut of 2008 and 2009. He argues that in the traditional view (the
monetary view), the cuts effectively increase consumption, but in the Ricardian view they
do not. Similarly, according to the traditional view, the United States’s sustained budget
deficits over the past several decades increased consumption, and thus reduced capital
accumulation and growth. The Ricardian view however, implies that these deficits had no
effect on consumption or capital accumulation. In other words, a tax-cut, or a transfer,
does not lead to an increase in consumption because households expect a future tax
increase. Therefore, the government budget is understood to adjust in order to neutralize
the effects of a tax-cut in present value. This view argues that while monetary policy is
active, the fiscal policy adjusts to a passive rule. That is, the price level is determined
solely by monetary variables, and fiscal policy is constrained by Ricardian equivalence.
The FTPL on the other hand, also referred to as a non-Ricardian regime, or a
fiscally dominant regime, asserts that fiscal policy can play a role in price level
determination, without the central bank resorting to seigniorage. The general price level
in this case has to “jump” in order to fulfill the present value budget constraint. That is,
primary surpluses follow an arbitrary process. Therefore, according to Canzonery et al.
(2001), the equilibrium path of prices is determined by the requirement of fiscal
solvency. In other words, when fiscal disturbances affect the equilibrium growth rate of
the money supply in this regime, the causality is not from the government budget to the
growth of the money supply, and then only from the change of the money supply to
prices. Instead, the government budget affects the general level of prices, and only
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because prices change does it also affect the money supply. That is, the money demand
increase, and as a result, so does the money supply. The FTPL also follows a rational
expectations equilibrium, in that as the government debt increases, so does household
wealth, and therefore the demand for goods and services, resulting in a price-level
increase. The proponents of the FTPL therefore claim that, a strict and independent
central bank is not enough to achieve a stable price level. Rather, steps must be taken to
ensure that appropriate fiscal policies are in place. Otherwise, the goal of price stability
may remain out of reach, despite the actions of the central bank.

2.2 The Role of Fiscal Policy on Price Level Determination
In studying the effects of fiscal policy on the price level, many approaches are
possible. Tkacevs (2006) lists two main channels through which fiscal policy may
impact prices: seigniorage and aggregate demand. Monetarists argue that fiscal policy can
have an impact on prices if the monetary authority prints money to finance the
government debt. This money creation increases the monetary base, which in turn creates
inflation. That is the seigniorage channel. This view, therefore, affirms Friedman’s view
that inflation is purely a monetary phenomenon, and can be easily managed by granting
the central bank its independence and not printing money as an option to finance budget
deficits. Nowadays, in developed economies, central banks are provided with
independence such that this channel is almost non-existent. However, in developing
countries where central banks are not independent, seigniorage is still used as a means to
finance government debt. The result is often chronic inflation or even hyperinflation, as
in the recent case of Zimbabwe between 2008 and 2009.
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Fiscal policy can also impact prices through its effect on aggregate demand.
Proponents of the FTPL argue that in a non-Ricardian setting, when the government’s
deficit increases, for example when there is a tax-cut, the permanent nominal income of
the private sector or the household increases. However, because the amount of available
resources in the economy has not changed, prices therefore must adjust to the new
equilibrium level, hence the inflation. Theoretically, this impact should be observed even
if the central bank is independent because the amount of resources in the economy is
unrelated to the independence of the central bank. Consequently, an independent central
bank is not the only remedy to fiscal policy-induced inflation, nor is it enough to stabilize
prices. One assumption that this channel makes, and that has been forcefully disputed, is
that the budget deficit is exogenous, determined by a political process that takes no
account of the level of debt or the need to pay it.
Semmler and Zhang (2003) argue that fiscal policy might affect monetary policy
outcomes in various ways: through its impact on general confidence in monetary policy,
through short-run effects on demand, and by modifying the long-term conditions for
economic growth and low inflation. They add, referring to Woodford (1995), that fiscal
policy affects the equilibrium price level because an increase in the price level reduces
the real value of the net (outside) assets of the private sector, or equivalently, net
government liabilities. In other words, an increase in the nominal value of outstanding
government liabilities, or in the size of the real government budget deficits expected at
some future dates, causes households to believe that their budgets have expanded. As a
result, they demand additional consumption immediately. Consequently, the excess
demand for goods forces the price level up to the point where the capital loss on the value

8

of net outside assets restores households’ estimates of their wealth to ones that just allow
them to purchase the quantity of goods that the economy can supply. Semmler and Zhang
(2003) therefore argue that the restrictions placed on members of the Euro-area are a
result of conclusions arrived at by the FTPL. Specifically, the Maastricht criteria restrict
each Euro-area member states deficit to 3 percent of GDP and debt to 60 percent of GDP.
These criteria make sense if one expects, as the FTPL suggests, that fiscal policy affects
the price level.
Despite the extensive literature on the theoretical framework behind the fiscal
theory of the price level, Leeper (1991), Woodford (1995), and Benassy (2008) the
empirical contributions are still few. The main point behind the FTPL is that the price
level is determined through the inter-temporal government budget constraint. If M+B1
represents the total government liabilities, and we scale the fiscal variables with GDP
(Py), CCD (2001) writes the budget constraint as Equation 1.
=
Where

−

+

+

(1)

is the primary surplus during period j, and ij is the interest rate for period j.

In the non-Ricardian regime, the price level adjusts in order to ensure that the real value
of the government debt equals the real present value of future budget surpluses. This idea
is in contrast with the conventional theories of price determination, which argue that the
stock of money (and therefore the monetary authority) determines the price level, and
fiscal policy adjusts passively to primary surpluses in order to guarantee solvency of the

1

M stands for nominal money supply, and B stands for stocks
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government for any price level. That is, according to the monetarist view, the level of
prices is determined by the quantity theory of money, which Equation 2 specifies
!" #" = $" %"

(2)

Where, !" is the nominal money supply, % is income, # is income velocity of money,

and $" is the price level. FTPL argues that if the fiscal authority is free to choose primary
surpluses independently of government debt, then the price level must adjust to satisfy
the present value of the government budget constraint. In other words, the government
commits to a fixed and exogenous present value of primary fiscal surpluses, and the price
level adjusts in order to satisfy equation (1).
The Fiscal Theory of the Price level emerged in the 1990s. It has proved to be
empirically difficult to observe and prove, as evidenced by the lack of literature. The
reason is that in both Ricardian and Non-Ricardian regimes, or the quantity theory of
money and the FTPL, the money supply and the price level move in the same direction.
However, the driving force is different in each theory. Therefore, simply looking at the
outcomes in terms of the price level and money supply, does not prove or disprove either
theory; this is to say, the two theories are observationally equivalent. However, the idea
that an independent central bank does not alone ensure price stability, but that fiscal
stability plays an important role as well, has made the FTPL the focus of much recent
research, especially that pertaining to monetary unions. Monetary unions may have a
rigorous and independent central bank, but as Berke (2009) explains, a government with
irresponsible fiscal policies could increase price levels all throughout the monetary union.
In a recent study of the FTPL, Berke (2009) uses panel cointegration to test how fiscal

policy affects price level determination in the European Union (EU). He uses four
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different models to answer the question of whether or not fiscal policy satisfies the
intertemporal budget constraints for all members of the EU, both old and new. In other
words, he tests whether or not governments in countries of the EU set their fiscal policies
with or without regard for fiscal solvency. Model one tests for cointegration between the
primary surplus and the (lagged) public debt-to-GDP ratio. Model two tests for
cointegration between the primary surplus including seigniorage and the (lagged) public
debt-to-GDP ratio. Model three tests for cointegration between the primary surplus and
the (lagged) government liabilities-to-GDP ratio. And lastly, model four tests for
cointegration between the primary surplus (including seigniorage) and the (lagged)
government liabilities-to-GDP ratio.
If the FTPL holds, Berke posits there should not be a cointegrating relationship
between the variables being tested in each of the four models. In his results, the null
hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected for most of the countries in the EU in all four
models, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. Berke concludes there is no
evidence of the FTPL in the countries of the European monetary union. In other words,
because the primary surplus and the total debt-to-GDP ratios are cointegrated, fiscal
policy in the European monetary union is consistent with the intertemporal budget
constraint. Thus, FTPL does not appear to fit European countries members of the EU.
Canzonery, Cumby, and Diba (CCD hereafter) arrived at a similar conclusion in
an earlier paper (CCD, 2001). Using a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) approach to assess
FTPL, they reason that in a non-Ricardian regime, positive shocks to primary surpluses
should raise the public debt to GDP ratio. However, they conclude that an examination of
post war US data shows the opposite: positive shocks to the primary surplus provoke a

11

fall in the public debt-to-GDP ratio, a response that they interpret as a rejection of the
FTPL.
More specifically, CCD use an approach that focuses on a set of impulse response
functions involving the primary surplus and total government liabilities (both as ratios to
GDP). In their approach, they argue that if government liabilities respond negatively to a
shock to the primary surplus, a Ricardian regime is plausible. This is because in this case
the government will use the surplus to service its debt. For example, they find in the US
data for the period between 1941 and 1992, a positive innovation in the primary surplus
decreases liabilities for several periods and increases future surpluses. According to
CCD, an interpretation of this result in Ricardian regimes is straightforward. That is,
surpluses are used to pay off debt in those regimes. In non-Ricardian regimes however,
CCD argue that the explanation is more convoluted, and requires that the correlation
between today’s surplus innovation and future surpluses become negative. In other
words, a Ricardian regime requires two criteria: a positive innovation (shock) in surplus
causes a fall in government liabilities in the next period, and the correlation between
surpluses is positive. A non-Ricardian regime on the other hand, causes a rise or no effect
to government liabilities, with the surpluses also positively correlated. Put differently, if
surpluses are positively correlated, a regime is said to be Ricardian if a positive shock to
surpluses causes the debt-to-GDP ratio to fall in the next period. And it is said to be nonRicardian, if the positive shock causes a negative response, or no response, of the debt-toGDP ratio in the following period. With this paper, CCD suggest two basic tenets:
Ricardian regimes are at least as theoretically plausible as non-Ricardian regimes, and
Ricardian regimes are more empirically plausible in the case of the US that they examine
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than non-Ricardian regimes. CCD’s work is extended by Creel et al. (2006) in their paper
on the fiscal theory of the price level.
In order to analyze the plausibility of a Ricardian regime, Creel et al. (2006) apply
CCD’s methodology to the case of the major Euro-area countries (France, Germany,
Italy) and the UK. A study of the Euro area is of particular relevance because it analyzes
the ability of the European Central Bank to achieve price stability. The case of the UK is
also relevant because it might have an implication with respect to the country’s possible
entry into European Monetary Union (EMU). In general terms, their paper investigates
the relationship between public debts and deficits through the lens of the FTPL.
Assuming a constant expected discount rate, and focusing their study on fiscal data, they
find that the impulse response functions of a VAR model, regardless of the approach that
one takes, are generally consistent with the benchmark of the Ricardian result obtained by
CCD. Therefore, they reject the FTPL hypothesis for the five major countries of the Euro
area that they study.
The countries that have been examined so far to study the FTPL have been
countries with disciplined central banks (the Euro area) and fiscal authorities. In my
research on the subject, I test what would happen if one or both of these institutions was
not under constant scrutiny. In other words, when the monetary and fiscal authorities are
not as sophisticated as they are in developed countries of the EU, or the United States, is
it possible to find evidence of the FTPL? I decided to turn to Africa, and more
specifically sub-Saharan Africa, because most countries in that part of the world are still
in the developing stage of at least one, if not both, of these institutions. In a working
paper for the IMF, Baldini and Ribeiro (2008) study the anchor for price stability in sub-
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Saharan Africa (SSA). They find that throughout the period 1980 to 2005, a number of
SSA countries were characterized by either a chronically fiscally dominant regime, a
consistent adoption of monetary dominant regime, or by a lack of a clear monetary or
fiscal policy regime.
This paper by Baldini and Ribeiro (2008) empirically supports the FTPL. The
authors demonstrate convincingly that there are wealth effects of changes in nominal
public debt that pass through to the price level. They show that nominal public liabilities,
as reflected either by money growth, or in nominal public debt, matter for price stability.
Additionally, they find that the differences in the relative importance of monetary or
fiscal sources of inflation in SSA countries correspond to differences in the exchange
rate. In other words, countries in a monetary union (in this case the CFA) are less likely
to print money to pay their public debt, than countries that have a floating exchange rate
regime. Similar to the European Stability and Growth Pact of 1997 and the Maastricht
Treaty in the European Union, this result could be attributed to the restraints imposed
upon the CFA countries during this period. Both the pact and the treaty impose
restrictions and limitations on the public deficits of its members. Furthermore, the authors
find that non-CFA countries with fixed exchange rates but with domestic-currencydenominated sovereign debt such as Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, had higher
average inflation than CFA countries during the same time span. In summary, the paper
finds that throughout the period of 1980 to 2005, Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda,
and South Africa were characterized by a monetary dominant regime, while Botswana,
Burundi, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe were largely characterized by a fiscally dominant
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regime. In other words, as predicted by the FTPL, changes in nominal public debt affect
price variability in certain cases.
My thesis builds on CCD (2001) and Baldini and Ribeiro (2008). Baldini and
Ribeiro (2008) do not take into account possible regime switches. That is, it is possible
that a country within that period switched from having a fiscally dominant regime to a
monetary dominant regime. My work uses the VAR approach by CCD, to identify when
a regime switch occurred. A similar study was done by Semmler and Zhang (2003), who
analyze the interaction over time between monetary and fiscal policies in France and
Germany in the 70s, 80s, and 90s. Semmler and Zhang (2003) check whether there were
regime shifts in the interactions between monetary and fiscal policies, and if so, how this
occurred. They find that the two countries implemented non-Ricardian fiscal policy in the
period tested. My goal is to perform a similar analysis for SSA countries. Baldini and
Ribeiro found that there were many countries in sub-Sahara Africa that were
characterized by neither a fiscal nor a monetary dominant regime. One of my objectives
is to use CCD’s approach to check if one of the underlying reasons for this was switches
between regimes during this period. In other words, for countries that went from war to
peace during this period (such as Mozambique), or that experienced monetary reforms
(such as Equatorial Guinea joining the CFA zone), my goal is determine if those changes
also brought about changes in regime. Additionally, I will determine if any of the
countries that are characterized by a fiscally or monetary dominant regime has undergone
a switch in regime during the same period.
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Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework
The theoretical framework of my thesis is partly based on the work of Leeper and
Walker (2012), who specify a model in which monetary or fiscal regimes determine the
price level. Essentially, in a monetary regime, also referred to as an active
monetary/passive tax policy regime, the price level is unaffected by increases in
government debt. As a result, a hawkish central bank successfully targets inflation, thus
making inflation a purely monetary phenomenon; this is the conventional outcome. In a
fiscally dominant regime on the other hand, monetary policy does not control inflation.
Also known as passive monetary/active tax policy regime, or the fiscal theory of the price
level (FTPL), Leeper and Walker (2012) argue that this regime better describes the
behavior of many countries in recent years. Table 1 illustrates the fiscal stress faced by
the richest countries in the world.
TABLE 1: NET PRESENT VALUE OF IMPACT ON FISCAL DEFICIT OF AGING-RELATED SPENDING, IN
PERCENT OF GDP
Country

Aging-related spending

Australia
420
Canada
726
France
276
Germany
280
Italy
169
Japan
158
Korea
683
Spain
652
United Kingdom
335
United States
495
Advanced G-20 countries
409
Copied from Leeper and Walker (2012), p.4 (Original Source: International Monetary
Fund, 2009)
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According to Table 1 the amount of aging-related spending or old-age benefits
these governments have promised exceeds their revenue. This creates a considerable
amount of unfunded government liabilities. As a result, Leeper and Walker (2012) argue
that the economic consequences of these deficits, especially on inflation, should make
many economists reconsider their view on the FTPL. Assuming that for most industrial
economies listed in Table 1, defaulting or monetizing these liabilities is not plausible,
Leeper and Walker (2012) emphasize two alternatives. The first alternative is that these
governments must convince the public that the government will adjust its revenues and
spending to ensure that fiscal policy solvency. If the public is convinced, then Table 1
presents them with the size of the deficit they will have to cover; and the conventional
paradigm, in which central banks control inflation, prevails. This alternative will only
work if the government is credible, in order to anchor expectations on those adjustments.
The second alternative, however, is if the government is not credible; here Leeper and
Walker argue that there will be a price level change induced by this large fiscal deficit,
hence the FTPL. In other words, countries with poor fiscal infrastructures will most likely
suffer inflation, based on the FTPL. Leeper and Walker (2012) therefore analyze
scenarios where the fiscal stress would lead to inflation.

3.1 A Simple Model of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction
The model below draws from Leeper and Walker’s work on the role of monetary
and fiscal policy on price level determination and equilibrium. Each period, an infinitely
lived representative household is endowed with a constant quantity of nonstorable goods,
y. The economy is assumed to be cashless in order to avoid seigniorage considerations.
Leeper and Walker introduce money later in their analysis. If the government issues
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nominal one-period bonds, we can therefore define the price level, P, as the rate at which
bonds exchange for goods. The household’s utility function is specified in Equation 3.
"
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with prices and R-1B-1>0 taken as given. R is the nominal interest rate. The household can
either consume or buy bonds (B) from the government. In other words, the household
chooses a combination of {ct,Bt} to maximize equation (1). It also pays taxes, 5" , and

receives transfers, 6" , each period, both of which are lump sum.

Government spending is zero each period, so the fiscal authority chooses
sequences of taxes, transfers, and debt to satisfy its flow constraint specified in Equation
(5)
4
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given R-1B-1 > 0, the monetary authority chooses a sequence for the nominal interest rate.

If we impose goods market clearing, that is, ct = y for t ≥ 0, the household’s Euler
equation reduces to the simple Fisher relation specified in Equation 6.
74
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Leeper and Walker use this model to describe a small open economy where
government debt is in terms of the home country’s nominal bonds. In other words, the
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currency and debt are held by domestic agents. The exogenous or fixed gross real interest
rate, 1/ ), simplifies the analysis.

3.2 Monetary Dominant Regime (MD): Active Monetary/ Passive Tax Policy
The conventional theory of the price level assumes the active monetary/passive
fiscal policy regime. It is based on the premise that any tax-cut will increase government
debt, and the private sector will expect a future tax increase or a transfer reduction. As a
result, a Ricardian equivalence ensues. That is, the tax-cut leaves the household’s
consumption unaffected. Romer (2012) argues that the Ricardian view implies, for
example, that the US tax cut of 2008 and 2009 had no effect on consumption or capital
accumulation. Therefore, a Ricardian equivalence or an MD regime is a mixture of a rule
in which the monetary policy aggressively adjusts the nominal interest rate in response to
current inflation, while fiscal policy adjusts taxes in response to government debt in order
to ensure solvency. To derive the equilibrium price level in this regime, Leeper and
Walker specify rules for monetary, tax, and transfers policies. First, monetary policy
follows a conventional interest rate rule as specified in (7).
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Where, B ∗ is the inflation target and < ∗ = B ∗ /) is the steady state nominal interest

rate. The condition on >, the policy parameter, ensures that monetary policy stabilizes
inflation around B ∗ .

Second, fiscal policy adjusts taxes in response to the state of the government debt
according to Equation 8.
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Where, b* is the real debt (or debt-to-GDP ratio) target, 5 ∗ is the steady state level

of taxes, and r=1/ )-1 is the net real interest rate. The condition on D guarantees that any
increase in government debt will be matched by the expectation that future taxes will rise
by enough to both compensate for the higher debt and return it back to b*.
Lastly, the authors assume that government transfers evolve exogenously
according to the stochastic process specified by Equation 9.
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0 < G < 1,
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Where z* is the steady-state transfer and H" is a serially uncorrelated shock with

= 0. These rules guarantee that both equilibrium inflation and expected inflation

are anchored on target inflation B ∗ . Equilibrium inflation is obtained by combining

equations (4) and (5) to yield equation 10.
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The unique bounded solution for inflation is B" = B ∗ , with the central bank being

hawkish implying that I < 1.
A

With monetary policy aggressively targeting inflation, tax policy’s role is to
stabilize the government’s debt. Shocks to the government debt can arise from transfers.
In this regime, when there are disturbances in transfers, the tax policy simply adjusts
taxes to ensure that policy is sustainable. That is, government debt is stabilized without
action from the central bank. By combining the tax rule, Equation (6), and the
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government budget constraint, Equation (3), taking expectations conditional on
information at t-1, and employing the Fisher relation, Equation (4), Leeper and Walker
(2012) demonstrate that the expected evolution of real debt is described by Equation 11.
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From the expression 1/) − D < 1 derived from equation (6), the authors conclude

that debt that is above target is followed by an expectation of higher taxes. That is, a
government deficit leads to a tax increase Therefore, Equation 11 describes how debt
returns to its steady state value given a shock in zt. In other words, disturbances in
transfers do not raise wealth because the household saves the money they receive,
knowing that taxes will increase later to service the government’s higher debt. Therefore,
the aggregate demand curve remains unchanged. The tax policy is passive in that it
adjusts taxes to finance disturbances to government debt. That is, it supports the behavior
of the active monetary policy by ensuring that the price level is unaffected by the higher
debt.
Another way to consider the model above is to assume that with rational agents,
the government’s revenue comes from taxes and transfers. In this case, Leeper and
Walker argue that the government debt derives its value from its anticipated backing,

which means that the future sequence of tax revenues net transfer payments, 5" − 6" , is
the source of revenue necessary to pay debt. In other words, an increase in transfer
payments increases the debt. The authors show that the value of the government debt can
be obtained by imposing an equilibrium on the government’s flow constraint, taking
conditional expectations, and solving for the following period, to arrive at Equation 12.
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According to Equation 12, an increase in transfers at t, must generate an expectation that
taxes will rise in the future in order to sustain the higher value of real debt Bt/Pt. This
result makes sense in the case of passive tax policy because the price level, Pt, is set by

monetary policy, and transfers, {6" }23 , are set independently of both monetary and tax
policies. An analysis of Equation 12 demonstrates that for a prices to increase, either
taxes have to decrease, or transfers have to increase. This equation is an intertemporal
condition and it provides an alternative perspective on tax policy. This result is the
conventional view of the price level. Tax policy ensures that the government’s debt is
stable by supporting the behavior of the active monetary policy, to reach a unique
equilibrium. However, this equilibrium is not the only one that is generated by an
interaction between monetary and tax policy. In the following section, I discuss the other
scenario, which is that of the FTPL.

3.3 Fiscally Dominant Regime (FD): Passive Monetary/Active Tax Policy
When inflation stabilization is not the unique priority of a central bank, the
monetary policy is said to be passive. An example of this is the recent financial crisis.
Central banks’ priorities shifted away from inflation stabilization toward other
macroeconomic problems, such as output or financial-market stabilization. The fiscal
theory of the price level, FTPL, also known as passive monetary/active tax policy regime,
or FD regime, is closely related to what is observed in this scenario. In their work on this
regime, Leeper and Walker suppose that higher deficits do not lead to higher expected
surpluses, and that central banks focus their attention on either pegging short-term
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nominal interest rates or raising them only weakly with inflation. Also known as nonRicardian equivalence, in this regime, the monetary policy is passive, while fiscal policy
is active. An example of this is the Banque de France during the 1920s. Bordo and
Hautcoeur (2007) point out that during that period, the Banque de France pegged nominal
bond prices at the same time that political gridlock prevented the fiscal adjustments
necessary to stabilize debt, which resulted in inflation.
In order to reach a result that has a clean economic interpretation from the simple
model above, Leeper and Walker use a particular policy mix in which the nominal
interest rate is set independently of inflation, > = 0 (from (5)), and <" = < ∗

≥ 1.

Additionally, taxes are set independently of debt, D = 0 (from (6)), and 5" = 5 ∗ > 0. The
first observation is that the nominal interest rate can be used in the Fisher relation of (4)
to obtain Equation 13.
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This result shows that expected inflation is still anchored on the inflation target. Actual
inflation on the other hand, cannot be determined as it was in the MD regime. The
authors demonstrate that this comes from the fact that if the active tax rule is imposed on
equation (10), yielding Equation 14.
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and the government’s flow constraint, (3), is used to solve for the price level, the result is
Equation 15.
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The numerator of Equation 15 is predetermined because at t, it represents the nominal
value of household wealth carried this period. The denominator represents the expected
present value of primary fiscal surpluses from date t on, which is independent of either
policy. Therefore, as long as R*Bt-1 >0, and the present value of future revenues is higher
than the present value of future transfers, which is the case if the government debt has a
positive value, Equation 15 delivers a unique Pt > 0. Monetary policy only has an impact
on expected inflation because the central bank chooses the nominal interest rate peg. At
the same time, conditional on that choice, the fiscal variables determine actual inflation.
This control of monetary policy over expected inflation is only possible in this simple
case, however. Additionally, Leeper and Walker emphasize that in this simple case, only
one of the two aims of an inflation targeting central bank is attainable, that is, anchoring
of expected inflation. The other, stabilization of actual inflation, cannot.
If expectations are anchored, and with nominal interest rates pegged, the higher
deficit, or higher nominal debt, created by a tax cut will initially be perceived by
household as an increase in real wealth. As a result, they will increase their consumption,
thus shifting up aggregate demand. The increase in aggregate demand translates into an
increase in prices, until the wealth effect dissipates. With real wealth falling back to its
pre-tax-cut level, households are satisfied with their initial consumption plan. Pegged
nominal interest rates have two important features: they stop nominal interest rates from
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rising with inflation and they allow the monetary policy to stunt the growth of debt
service, thus steadying the value of government bonds. In this regime, monetary policy is
able to anchor inflation on the inflation target, but actual inflation is determined by the
fiscal policy, hence the fiscal theory of the price level.
A case study with which to consider the FTPL is the Federal Reserve’s bond-price
pegging policy, during and immediately after World War II to which Woodford (2001)
alludes. In his attempt to show that fiscal policy can affect the price level even when the
central bank pursues an autonomous monetary policy, Woodford argues that fiscal
dominance manifests itself through pressure on the central bank to use monetary policy to
maintain the market value of the government debt. In other words, the impact of fiscal
policy is not just through the financing of the fiscal debt by money creation -that is,
seigniorage- but it is also through ensuring that the government debt can be sold at a high
price. Woodford focuses is the yield on 90-day and long-term treasury bonds between
1942 and 1951 shown in Figure 1.
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FIGURE 1: YIELD ON U.S. TREASURY SECURITIES
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Beginning in April 1942, the Fed and the Treasury agreed to an interest-rate
control program that aimed at stabilizing prices and yields for government securities.
Woodford uses Figure 1 to show that the yield on 90-day Treasury bills was pegged at
about 3/8 of a percent. This peg was maintained until June 1947 as the Treasury offered
both to buy and sell bills at that price. Additionally, the price of long-term bonds (25
years) was also fixed at a price of about 2 and ½ percent annually. This price was
maintained until the “Accord” in March 1951. This commitment of the Fed to support the
price of long term bonds was a central element of Fed policy during this period. In
particular, Woodford highlights the case in 1949, when bond prices rose. During the first
half of 1949, the Fed sold over three billion dollars of its bond holdings (Eichengreen and
Garber, 1991, p. 184). The impact of this action of the Fed can be seen on the evolution
of the consumer price index during this same period, shown in Figure 2,
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FIGURE 2: CONSUMER PRICE INDEX
28
26
24

Index

22
20
18
16
14
12
10
1942

1943

1944

1945

1946

1947

1948

1949

1950

1951

Figure 2 shows that the 1940s were a period of inflation for the U.S. Woodford
attributes this inflation to wartime conditions, though wage and price controls suppressed
much of it. When the price control regime was removed (in 1946) however, there was a
burst of inflation, visible in Figure 2 between 1946 and 1947. Woodford points out that
the burst is a result of price adjustment and not of increase in aggregate demand. In other
words, the prices jumped to their equilibrium level; where they would have been, had the
price control regime not been in place. After the adjustment, between 1948 and 1950,
there is deflation which, according to Woodford, is a result of the bond price-support
regime. The Korean war in June 1950 brought about another surge in prices. The bond
price-support regime was then suspended because it was thought to be an “engine of
inflation”.
Woodford (2001) argues that these effects upon the general level of prices cannot
be explained solely through any direct effect of fiscal developments upon monetary
policy, understood to refer to the Fed’s rule for setting interest rate, which is through
money supply. That is, inflation in this case is a result of active fiscal policy. Therefore,
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Woodford demonstrates that the government budget can play a role in price-level
determination. He argues that it is possible to salvage a quantity theoretic view of
inflation determination in such a regime by saying that the money supply depends upon
the government budget, as well as the interest-rate rule; and, in equilibrium, that is true.
But what Woodford underlines is that the causality is not directly from government
budget to the growth of the money supply, and then only from the change in the money
supply to prices. Rather, he argues that the government budget affects the general level of
prices, and only because prices change does it also affect the money supply, as higher
prices imply a higher demand for money, which the Fed must accommodate under such a
regime. In terms of causality, these two views could be represented in this way:
Quantity-theoretic view (V1): ∆V#W E*XVYW → ∆[\]Y% ^*__`% →
∆_Fa,Y^ +a]b`cWa\]-

Bond price-support view (V2): ∆V#W E*XVYW → ∆_Fa,Y^ +a]b`cWa\]- →

∆[\]Y% ^*__`%

While V1 and V2 might oversimply the two regimes, V2 describes the FTPL.
Intuitively, one might suppose that a bond price-support regime would imply that there is
a direct connection between the government budget and the growth of the money supply.
In other words, a commitment by the Fed to act as the purchaser of government debt
would require the Fed to increase the monetary base. This would increase the central
bank’s holdings of government debt, whenever the Treasury issues more debt, which
means whenever the government runs a budget deficit. However, Woodford argues that
such an analysis is superficial because it assumes that the public’s demand for
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government bonds is fixed so that in the absence of a bond price change the Fed would
need to buy the additional bonds. It assumes at the same time that there is no obstacle to
increasing the public’s money holdings by an arbitrary amount, without any change in the
relative yield on money and bonds. That is, the Fed cannot change the monetary base
without accepting a change in the level of interest rate, which is fixed in the bond pricesupport regime. Woodford’s analysis demonstrates that the quantity of money that must
be supplied in order to maintain bond prices at their target levels is a function solely of
prices and real activity. Thus the government budget will be able to affect the money
supply only because it is able to affect equilibrium prices through another channel, the
demand of money; prices will not be affected only because of the change in the money
supply, as V1 shows.
While Leeper and Walker and Woodford demonstrate that theoretically, the
impact of fiscal policy on inflation is undeniable, they admit that the problem of
observational equivalence arises when attempting to prove this theory empirically.
Leeper and Walker state that “until we tackle this formidable empirical challenge, we
cannot use data to distinguish perceptions from misperceptions about fiscal inflation.
(Leeper 2012, p.6)” While acknowledging that central bankers who target inflation target
must know whether the economy resides in a MD or FD regime, the authors recognized
that it is difficult to distinguish between the two regimes using data. That is why I also
turned to Fialho and Portugal (2005) to add to the conceptual framework of my thesis. I
used their paper on monetary and fiscal policy interactions in Brazil. In this paper, Fialho
and Portugal verify the predominance of a monetary or fiscal dominance regime in the
post-Real (Brazil’s currency) period. The authors find that there is a relationship between
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the public debt/GDP, and primary surplus/GDP. Fialho and Portugal conclude that
throughout the study period, there is a predominantly monetary regime in Brazil.
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Chapter 4: Methodology and Data
In this section, I present the methodological framework and the data I use to
conduct this study. Specifically, I present a detailed description of the theoretical and
empirical specifications of the model, variables in the model, data, estimation techniques,
and tools for data analysis.

4.1 Methodology
My approach is similar to that of Fialho and Portugal (2005). Their focus is on
Brazil while mine is on sub-Sahara African (SSA) countries. The goal of their paper is to
investigate which one of the two regimes was dominant in Brazil in the post-Real period.2
The authors use the response of public debt/GDP to an innovation in the primary
surplus/GDP as a test to determine regime type. Fialho and Portugal base this test on the
methodology developed by CCD (2001). Using a nonstructural Vector Autoregression
(VAR) analysis, this method allows the authors to determine monetary or fiscal-dominant
regimes. It uses the impulse response of public liabilities to a positive shock to primary
surpluses. Baldini and Ribeiro add that this test is conditional on the persistence of the
primary surplus, which is estimated by an autocorrelation analysis between surpluses.
Therefore, CCD set a minimum of 5 lags on a surplus that is positive for it to be
persistent. Otherwise, they treat the surplus as negatively autocorrelated, indicating low
persistence. From the analysis of CCD (2001), Fialho and Portugal (2005), and Baldini
and Ribeiro (2008), I conclude that a regime type is determined by both the relationship
between surpluses and between primary surplus and government debt.

2

Real is the currency of Brazil.
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When a surplus is positively persistent, under a MD regime, a positive shock in
the current surplus induces a fall in future liabilities in order to guarantee fiscal solvency.
In other words, under this regime, the government uses the surpluses to pay its debt,
preventing any inflation. Consequently, a MD regime is characterized by a negative
relationship between current surpluses and future liabilities. Under a FD regime,
however, the fiscal surpluses are assumed to be exogenous, that is, taxes and debt are set
independently of each other, which means that future liabilities should be either
unaffected by a current increase in surpluses or lead to an increase of the same. The
reason is that GDP includes the price level, and are negatively correlated. That is, when
prices increases, the GDP decreases. These are the criteria that Fialho and Portugal
(2005) use to determine which regime Brazil was under in the post-Real period.
Following the approach of CCD (2001), I identify -or in some cases partially identifynon-Ricardian regimes. Using the ratio of the primary budget (or surplus) to nominal
GDP and ratio of government liabilities (both the federal debt and the money base) to
nominal GDP, CCD run a bivariate VAR model, and interpret the response of both
variables to shocks in the primary budget in terms of Ricardian and non-Ricardian
regimes. The use of VAR is necessary because often economic and financial variables are
not only contemporaneously correlated to each other, but they are also correlated to each
other’s past values. The VARMAX procedure in SAS (Statistical Analysis System) is
used model these types of time relationships. It is used to model the dynamic relationship
both between the dependent variable (primary surplus) and the independent variable
(liabilities). Therefore, given a multivariate time series, VAR estimates the model
parameters and generates forecasts associated with vector autoregressive moving-average
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processes with exogenous regressors models. I use the orthogonalized impulse response
because it isolates the response of the variable and does not cumulate the response of the
system.
After the VAR analysis is run, CCD uses the following criteria to determine the
regime of a country:
•

If a positive shock to the surplus (st), leads to a decrease in next period’s level of
government liabilities (wt+1), while the surpluses are positively correlated, they conclude
that the country is under a monetary dominant regime (MD). In other words, this result
would imply that the spike in surplus is used to service the government debt.

•

If on the other hand, the positive shock on the surplus leads to a positive initial response
of liabilities, or no response at all (with the surpluses still positively correlated), they
conclude that the country is under a fiscally dominant regime (FD). Put differently, the
one-time increase in the surplus shock is not used to service the debt at all, but for other
purposes. That is, the government invests in other costly expenses that lead to further
debt.

•

Any other outcome leads to an inconclusive result, which they classify as a non-identified
regime. Table 2 below summarizes these criteria.
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TABLE 2: IDENTIFICATION CRITERIA FOR FISCAL AND MONETARY DOMINANCE REGIMES
Criteria3

Autocorrelation of
the surpluses

Regime

Criterion 1

Response of future
Liabilities to current
Surpluses4
negative (-)

positive (+)

Criterion 2
Criterion 3

negative(-)
non-negative(0 or +)

positive (+)
positive (+)

Criterion 4

negative or positive
(-, 0, or +)

Negative (-)

Monetary
Dominance (MD)
Non-Identified (NI)
Fiscal Dominance
(FD)
Non-identified (NI)

Source: Ribeiro and Baldini, (2008), Table 2.

These criteria stem from the equation of the price level, equation 15’, in the previous
section. Using an FTPL view, of FD regime view, the price level follows the equation:
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When a positive surplus shock occurs, the denominator of Equation 16 increases, which
means that the expression decreases, and the price level falls. In other words, because the
government liabilities are in terms of GDP (w/PY), and the price level is included in
GDP, government liabilities rise. If the surplus however, is used to service those
liabilities, the result is that of criterion 1 in Table 2, meaning the conclusion is that there
is a monetary dominant regime. That is, government liabilities fall because the
government pays its debt. If on the other hand, there is no effect to liabilities, or the debt
increases, the result is that of criterion 3 in Table 2, a fiscally dominant regime. In any
case, the positive surplus shock leads to a deflation. A negative shock will therefore cause
inflation, with the opposite explanation.

3 Variables are in real terms as they are expressed in percentage of GDP. Surplus is primary surplus, including grants
and seigniorage; Liabilities include public debt, and reserve of money
4
When VAR ordering is Primary Surplus→Liabilities, the interpretation is consistent with an FD regime characterized
by an ‘active’ fiscal policy.
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Using these criteria, and available data, Ribeiro and Baldini (2008) classify 22 in
SSA in one of these categories. In my thesis, I use the same method, and I add a
structural break test to determine if there was a change in regime during the same period.
A structural break is detected when the time series abruptly changes at a point in time.
This change could involve a change in mean or a change in the other parameters of the
process that produce the series. In my analysis, the change is that of inflation. I use Stata
to run this analysis. Given the break year, if it is significant, I use the criteria of Table 1
to determine which regime the country was under before the break year, and which one it
switched to. To give an illustration of this methodology, the next two sections use the
U.S. and Kenya as examples.

4.2 The American Experience Before the Accord of 1951
I use the data of the U.S. before the Accord of 1951 to test this methodology. This
period is immediately after World War II. I alluded to this case as a potential example of
a fiscally dominant period because it is a documented fact that the Federal Reserve was
using a bond-price pegging regime during this period. In his analysis of this period,
Woodford (2001) does not empirically test his hypothesis that the U.S. is under fiscally
dominant regime. Rather, he argues that this period has the traits of the FTPL.
With the nominal interest rate pegged, the monetary policy during this period can
therefore be qualified as passive. Consequently, the fiscal policy was active. While I used
the consumer price index, the US yield on 90-day securities, and long term bonds to
argue that the Fed seemed to be passive, I did not however show the dominance of the
fiscal policy. In this section, I use the methodology presented above to determine which
regime the US was under. In figure 7, I present the key series that I analyze:
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FIGURE 3: U.S. FISCAL DATA, 1942-1995
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Using the inflation data from 1941 to 1992, I graph the inflation of the US during
this period. The result is shown in Figure 4.
FIGURE 4: INFLATION IN THE U.S. BETWEEN 1941 AND 1992
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Figure 8 shows a significant drop in inflation after 1951, the year of the accord. The
surplus/GDP ratio is calculated by adding on budget to off budget federal receipts
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(including central bank transfer) less federal outlays (including net federal interest
payments), all divided by nominal GDP. I calculate the liabilities/GDP ratio by adding
the net federal debt to the monetary base, both measured at the beginning of the fiscal
year, and dividing by nominal GDP for the fiscal year. To start the VAR analysis, I first
run a VAR of surplus on liabilities over the whole entire period.5
FIGURE 5: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN U.S BETWEEN 1941 AND 1992

The initial response of liabilities (w) is positive, which would indicate a fiscally dominant
regime. The next step is to run the autocorrelations of the surpluses to determine
conclusively this result.
TABLE 3: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN U.S. BETWEEN 1941 AND 1992
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
ps l1us_ps l2us_ps l3us_ps l4us_ps l5us_ps
ps 1.00000 0.78938 0.48514 0.18809 -0.12831 -0.45129
ps
<.0001 0.0002 0.1818 0.3695 0.0010

The surpluses alternate signs, which means that the regime is non-identified during the
period 1941-1992. Aside from the last period, the first four periods are positive, which

5

The debt in the Liabilities equation does not include that held by the Federal Reserve system. The surplus
I use is the primary surplus. That is, the government surplus before the interest net payment is made.
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would indicate a fiscally dominant regime during this period. The FTPL could therefore
be used to explain this response if less than periods are used for show positive
autocorrelation.
The structural break test detects a significant break in 1952 (p-value=0.0000), the
year after the accord. This is in accordance with the observation made earlier on the
inflation graph. I therefore divide the data set in two, before and after 1952 to determine
if there was a switch in regime;
FIGURE 6: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN U.S BEFORE 1952

TABLE 4: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN U.S. BEFORE 1952
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
ps l1us_ps l2us_ps l3us_ps l4us_ps l5us_ps
ps 1.00000 0.73748 0.34310 -0.01514 -0.40007 -0.62390
ps
0.0149 0.3660 0.9716 0.3738 0.1856

While the initial response of liabilities is negative, the surpluses are not positively
correlated for all 5 periods, even though the p-values of the negative coefficients are not
significant. I conclude that the regime was non-identified before the Accord. This result
is somewhat indicative of the aftermath of the war. Even though the fiscal authority was
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active, the monetary police was not completely passive either, which is why the result is
inconclusive. After the Accord however, the fiscal authority becomes passive.
FIGURE 7: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN U.S AFTER 1952

TABLE 5: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN U.S. AFTER 1952
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
ps l1us_ps l2us_ps l3us_ps l4us_ps l5us_ps
ps 1.00000 0.48076 0.22545 0.23675 0.31098 0.27639
ps
0.0017 0.1676 0.1524 0.0610 0.1027

Fig. 7 and Table 5 confirm that the US switched to a monetary dominant regime after the
Accord. The response of liabilities is negative, and the surpluses are positively correlated
for all 5 periods. Therefore, I conclude using the methodology described earlier, that after
the Accord, the US switched to a MD regime.
Inflation during this period (1952 to 1992) spiked because with the nominal
interest rate pegged, agents increased their demand for goods and services because the
government was not expected to react by increasing taxes in the future. The increase in
demand of goods and services would have created inflationary pressures, had the price
control regime not been in place. As a result, the price level was relatively constant and

39

did not jump until the controls were removed. When the controls were removed in 1946,
the inflationary pressures surged, hence the inflation observed around 1946.
Additionally, we can explain the deflation between 1948 and 1950 if we consider,
as Woodford notes, that during this “period the large wartime deficits had ended, and the
U.S. government budget was instead chronically in surplus” (Woodford, 2001, p.9),
which means the above explanation is reversed, surplus instead of deficit. The bond
price-support regime was halted at the beginning of the Korean war in 1950 when the
government budget began to run a deficit again. This is indeed the case in a deficit
scenario, and the Accord was signed on March 1951. This brief period provided an
example of regime switch in the US economy went from a non-identified regime
immediately after the war, to a MD regime after the Accord was signed.

4.3 The Kenyan experience
According to Baldini and Ribeiro (2008), Kenya’s economy can be described as in a
monetary dominant regime between 1980 and 2005. In order to arrive at their result, I run
the VAR regression and obtain the following impulse responses illustrated in Figure 8
FIGURE 8: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN KENYA BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005
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The response is the bold line, while the other two represent the standard errors. The
impulse response of liabilities (KEN_w) to a surplus shock is negative. This result
suggests, as Baldini and Ribeiro do, that Kenya was in a monetary dominant regime,
which means that the surplus was used to service the government debt. In order to
substantiate this, the correlation between the surpluses must be positive. These
autocorrelations are shown in Table 6
TABLE 6: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN KENYA BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
KEN_s l1ken_s l2ken_s l3ken_s l4ken_s l5ken_s
KEN_s 1.00000 0.75859 0.46502 0.25897 0.10274 0.03959
KEN_s
<.0001 0.0220 0.2328 0.6491 0.8647

Table 6 above clearly shows that the surpluses are positively correlated. After the
first and second periods, the coefficients are not significant anymore, but stay positive for
all 5 periods. We can therefore conclude that Kenya is under a monetary dominant
regime during the period 1980 to 2005.
This result confirms that of Ribeiro and Baldini. Following the methodology
described above, I take it a step further, and check for a change in regime in the country’s
economy by using Kenya’s inflation data to test for a structural break. The result of the
test is a break year that I then use to split the data into two subsets. Kenya’s inflation
history is shown in Figure 9;
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FIGURE 9: INFLATION IN KENYA BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005
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The inflation process appears to change after 1993, the year of the peak. Running the
break test, I find that there is a significant break year in 1994 (p-value =0.0332). This
break year confirms my observation. I therefore perform a VAR analysis on each subset
of data, before and after 1994. The response before 1994 is shown in Figure 10;
FIGURE 10: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN KENYA BEFORE 1994

The initial response of liabilities is negative, which indicates a monetary dominant
regime. The next step is to check for the autocorrelations between the surpluses.
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TABLE 7: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN KENYA BEFORE 1994
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
KEN_s l1ken_s l2ken_s l3ken_s l4ken_s l5ken_s
KEN_s 1.00000 0.66393 0.18758 0.33162 0.27962 0.17410
KEN_s
0.0133 0.5594 0.3191 0.4340 0.6542

The surpluses are all positively correlated, though insignificant; I determine that
Kenya was under a monetary dominant regime before the break year. However, after
1994, there is a switch in regime. Although not yet predominant, a fiscally dominant
regime seems to emerge from the data. Figure 11 contains the impulse response.
FIGURE 11: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN KENYA AFTER 1994

The figure above shows that the impulse response of liabilities has changed from
being negative, to being positive. In other words, as previously stated, the price level
decreases in response to an exogenous, positive shock to the budget. Therefore, because
nominal GDP decreases, government liabilities increase, hence the positive response of
KEN_w. This result indicates that the country switched regime. This result is confirmed
when I run the autocorrelation analysis of surpluses which I report in Table 6.
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TABLE 8: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN KENYA AFTER 1994
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
KEN_s l1ken_s l2ken_s l3ken_s l4ken_s l5ken_s
KEN_s 1.00000 0.67504 0.57109 0.61475 0.64999 0.41995
KEN_s
0.0227 0.0846 0.0781 0.0810 0.3482

Through these steps, I conclude that Kenya, went from a monetary dominant
regime before 1994, to a fiscally dominant regime after. The reason why the overall result
of Baldini and Ribeiro is monetary dominant is likely because the response after the
break year is considerably smaller than that before the break. In other words, the regime
is slowly changing.

4.4 SSA data
In my empirical work, I use SSAcountries’ financial data to determine fiscal or
monetary dominance.6 I obtain the data from Baldini and Ribeiro (2008). The data
covers a twenty-six-year span, between 1980 and 2005, and include economic variables
such as the consumer price index, foreign debt, and government balance including and
excluding grants, all as a percent of GDP. Baldini and Ribeiro collected these data from
three main sources: the IMF African Department database, the IMF World Economic
Outlook (WEO), and the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS). Additionally,
because a unified data source for the SSA region does not exist for the period 1980-2005,
I compute the public debt variables (both domestic and foreign) using Christensen
(2004), the IMF country desks data, the World Bank African Indicators (WBAI), and the

6

With the exception of Mauritania, North and South Sudan, Eritrea, Liberia, Djibouti, Reunion, Western
Sahara and Somalia.
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World Bank Development Indicators (WDI). In any case, data for some countries are not
available.
Following Baldini and Ribeiro (2008)approach, I divide the SSA region into three
groups: the first group includes 14 CFA countries and the Union of Comoros7; the second
group includes non-CFA countries with a fixed exchange rate8 (NCFA fixed); and the
third group includes 22 non-CFA countries characterized by either an independently
fixed or floating exchange rate regime (Other regime). The data that I use for my analysis
includes inflation, the primary balance, seigniorage, and the reserve of money. The other
aggregates that are important for my analysis, such as total primary surplus, total public
debt, and total public liabilities are a combination of the first four variables I listed above.

4.4.1 Inflation and Primary Balance in SSA Countries
4.4.1.1 The CFA Zone
Table 9 contains average inflation rates and primary balances in the countries of
the CFA zone;

7

The CFA (African Financial Community in west African, and African Financial Cooperation in central
Africa) arrangement has been in place since the mid-1940s. It is a fixed-exchanged rate arrangement with
France on one side and two monetary unions in West and Central Africa on the other. In the west, the West
African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, GuineeBissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. In central Africa, the Central African Economic and Monetary
union (CEMAC) includes Cameroon, Central Africa Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial
Guinee, and Gabon. There are two distinct central bank in the monetary union, la Banque Centrale des
Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO in Dakar, Senegal) issues notes for WAEMU, while la Banque des
Etats de l’Afrique Centrale (BEAC in Yaounde, Cameroon) issues notes for the CEMAC. The Comorian
franc is also pegged to the Euro. WAEMU, CEMAC, Comoros, and France form the Franc zone.
8

Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland in this group were independently pegging their currencies to the South
African Rand; while Botswana, Cape Verde, and Seychelles pegged theirs to a basket of currencies.
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TABLE 9: INFLATION AND PRIMARY BALANCE IN CFA ZONE
CFA countries

Inflation
(CPI)

Primary Balance
(A)

Benin

4.5

-0.4

Burkina Faso

4.2

-2.9

Cameroon

5.5

1.0

Central African Rep.

4.4

-1.7

Chad

4.7

-3.5

Comoros

4.2

-4.5

Congo Republic

3.8

2.6

Cote d'Ivoire

5.3

-0.8

Equatorial Guinea

13.2

0.3

Gabon

4.8

3.4

Guinea-Bissau (1997-2005)

7.9

-8.2

Mali

4.3

-4.2

Niger

4.1

-1.7

Senegal

4.7

0.1

Togo

5.0

-2.2

Averages

5.4

-1.5

For most countries in the CFA region inflation rates are below 10 percent, with
the exception of Equatorial Guinea. In fact, a closer look at the two zones that make up
the CFA franc, WAEMU and CEMAC, shows a relatively stable price level from 1980 to
2015, with the exception of the sharp inflation around 1994, which I will explain next.
Figure 12 and 13 depict inflation rates in the WAEMU and CEMAC, respectively, over
this period. It gives a good sense of the evolution of the inflation rate during this time.
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FIGURE 12: WEST AFRICAN ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION CFA ZONE (WAEMU), 1980 TO
20159

Annualized Inflation Rate (percent)

50
40
30
20
10
0
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
-10
-20
Benin

Burkina Faso

Cote d'Ivoire

Mali

Niger

Senegal

Togo

Source: Ribeira and Baldini, 2008
FIGURE 13: INFLATION IN CFA FRANC ZONE (CAMU)
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9

The CAMU zone does not include Guinea-Bissau because it did not join the union until 1997.
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The CFA franc was introduced on December 26, 1945, in the wake of the Bretton Woods
conference, in order to cushion the colonies from a strong devaluation of the French franc
(FF) (Diagana et al., 199, p. 2). Later, in 1958, the CFA franc became the Franc of the
French Community of Africa (FCFA), borrowing from General de Gaulle’s idea of
‘community’ to the colonies of West and Central Africa. The parity between the French
franc and the CFA franc was fixed at 1 FF to 50 FCFA (Diagana et al., 1999). This
remained the exchange rate until France imposed a devaluation of the CFA franc on
January 12, 1994. This created an inflation that is observable in Figures 12 and 13 above.
Figure 14 illustrates the devaluation.
FIGURE 14: DEVALUATION OF THE CFA FRANC IN 1994
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The degree of inflation was different in every country, but each country experienced a
sudden inflation either immediately following the devaluation, or a year or two later.
Furthermore, the years prior to the devaluation (the second half of the 1980s) were
marked by a sharp fall in cocoa, coffee, cotton, and oil prices on international markets;
these commodities are those most exported by these countries. Therefore, this fall in
prices, compounded with an appreciating French franc against major currencies, made the
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zones’ exports less competitive. Meanwhile, the prices of imported goods rose sharply, as
the zones’ currency lost half its value overnight.
The sharp inflation observed in Figure 13 of Equatorial Guinea prior to 1985 was
before the country joined the CFA franc zone. The national currency, bipkwele, was
replaced by the CFA franc in 1985 when Equatorial Guinea joined the CAMU
(Salomonsson and Sandberg, 2010). Therefore, when they came under the rule of the
union, the drop in inflation followed. Overall, the WAEMU has a lower average inflation
rate, 3.97 percent, than the CAMU, 5.10 percent.
The other variable in Table 9 is the primary balance. With the exception of
Cameroon, Congo Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Senegal, most CFA
countries run a budget deficit. One of the reasons for these deficits is that all of these
countries are relatively poor countries, and known for undisciplined government. While
the monetary union stabilizes inflation, it does not necessarily have an impact on fiscal
policies because each government sets its own fiscal policies. In the context of the FTPL,
the larger the deficit, or the more negative the primary balance, the higher the price level.
That is, as inflation
4.4.1.2 The Non-CFA countries with fixed exchange rate (NCFA)
Table 10 lists countries inflation rates and primary balances for countries.
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TABLE 10: INFLATION AND PRIMARY BALANCE IN NCFA COUNTRIES
NCFA fixed countries
Botswana
Cape Verde

Inflation
(CPI)
10.1
7.4

Primary Balance
(A)
8.9
-7.9

Lesotho

11.4

-0.7

Namibia

10.7

-2.1

Seychelles

3.1

0.7

Swaziland

11.0

-0.1

Averages

8.9

-0.2

Non-CFA countries with a fixed exchange rate during the same period
experienced higher inflation and lesser price stability than CFA countries. Figure 15
depicts the inflation rate for these countries.
FIGURE 15: INFLATION IN NON-CFA FIXED COUNTRIES10
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Figure 15 illustrates less price stability for these countries, compared to the countries in
the previous group. The average inflation rate in this group is 8.95 percent, while it is
only 5.4 percent in the CFA zone, during the same period. Countries in the monetary
union have the same inflation behavior, while in the NCFA countries, the behavior of

10

Namibia is excluded because of insufficient data.
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inflation rate is different for each country. This makes sense because it is not a monetary
union, which means they do not have identical monetary restrictions. Only Botswana and
Seychelles have positive primary balances.
4.4.1.3 Other sub-Saharan countries (Others)
Lastly, Table 11 lists the inflation rates and primary balances of the countries in
the last group, the flexible exchange rate group. Only Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania, and
Uganda have a positive primary balance.
TABLE 11: INFLATION AND PRIMARY BALANCE IN OTHER SSA COUNTRIES11
Inflation
(CPI)

Primary Balance
(A)

Angola

420.2

-8.1

Burundi

10.5

-4.2

1359.9

-3.1

Ethiopia

5.8

-3.4

Gambia

10.6

-1.4

Ghana

34.1

-2.0

Guinea

16.9

-2.0

Guinea-Bissau(1980-1996)

54.8

-3.5

Kenya

12.8

1.7

Madagascar

16.2

-3.3

Malawi

22.6

-1.8

Mauritius

8.6

-1.0

Mozambique

32.0

-4.6

Nigeria

23.0

-0.3

Rwanda

9.9

-3.3

Sao Tome & Principe

23.7

-17.7

Sierra Leone

43.1

-3.8

South Africa

10.6

0.3

Tanzania

21.4

0.3

Uganda

54.7

1.7

Zambia

49.7

-6.3

Zimbabwe

62.7

-1.8

Averages

26.2

-2.8

Other SSA countries

Congo. Dem. Republic

11

The averages exclude Angola and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) because of their extremely high
values of inflation rates
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In order to present inflation in these countries, I divide this group into smaller
groups based on their location. For west Africa, I group Ghana, Gambia, Nigeria, Guinea,
and Sierra Leone. Their inflation over this period is shown in Figure 16.

Annualized Inflation Rate (percent

)

FIGURE 16: INFLATION IN WEST AFRICAN COUNTRIES12
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Between 1980 and 1983, with the exception of Sierra Leone, Ghana had the
highest inflation rate among these countries. According to Ocran (2007), this inflation
was the tail end of a series of high inflation episodes that started in the 1970s. During this
period, the country had inflation that exceeded 100 percent on four occasions. The figure
above shows two of those occasions, 1981 (116.5 percent) and 1983 (122.2 percent).
After 1983, Ghana embarked on a stabilization policy program supported by the Bretton
Woods institutions, but still suffered higher inflation than countries in the CFA zone, or
in the NCFA fixed rate regime. In fact, during the period considered in Figure 16 the

12

The axis on the right only applies to Sierra Leone because its inflation is considerably higher than the
other countries.
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average inflation in Ghana was about 27.8 percent, which is the second highest average
inflation; Sierra Leone has the highest, 35.56 percent, followed by Nigeria, 19.34 percent,
Guinea, 18.58 percent, and Gambia, 9.05 percent. The overall behavior of Figure 16
indicates that inflation for all the countries tapered off. However, the average inflation
rate in this group of countries, 18.7 percent, is higher than that of the two previous
groups. The CFA zones have a combined inflation average of only 5.4, while the nonCFA countries with fixed exchange rate have an average of about 8.95 percent.
Next, for southeast Africa, I group Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Figure 17 illustrates their inflation rates during this period, 1980
to 2015.
FIGURE 17: INFLATION IN SOUTHEAST AFRICAN COUNTRIES13
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In this group, South Africa has the lowest average inflation rate over the period, at
9.40 percent. Zambia and Mozambique have the highest at 38.41 percent and 24.86

13

The axis on the right is only for Angola’s inflation.
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percent, respectively, behind Angola. In the next chapter, I discuss the reasons for
Angola’s high inflation. The average inflation in this group of countries is also higher
than that of the countries in the CFA zone, or those with fixed regime rates. The average
inflation (excluding Angola) for this group is about 15.95 percent, which is lower than
the average in the countries of the previous group in west Africa. With the exception of
Zimbabwe between the years 2000 and 2009, inflation also seemed to diminish over time
in this region.
Additionally, for southeast Africa, I group Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Ethiopia,
and Rwanda. The inflation rates for these countries are illustrated in Figure 18.
FIGURE 18: INFLATION IN EAST AFRICAN COUNTRIES
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The average inflation rates for this group of countries is 17.94 percent. Uganda
has the highest average inflation rate at 42.49 percent, while Rwanda had the lowest at
8.40. The average inflation rate for this region is lower than the first region (west Africa)
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in this floating regime category. But the countries in the southeast region had a lower
inflation average than these five countries. This region also experienced a diminishing
level of inflation over the period.
The data presented thus far focused on inflation. The primary balance is also
included in the Table 9, 10, and 11. A primary balance that is negative means that over
the period considered, the country ran a fiscal deficit. Countries in the CFA zone or the
non-CFA with fixed exchange rate regime are not exempt from deficits, a problem a
monetary union cannot fix. Only five of the fifteen countries in the franc zone,
Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Senegal, have a
positive primary balance. Only two of the six countries in the NCFA group, Botswana
and Seychelles, and five of the twenty-two countries in the last group, Kenya, South
Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia, have a positive primary balance. A summary
table of inflation and primary balance averages in all the groups is shown in Table 12.14
TABLE 12: SUMMARY TABLE OF INFLATION

Average inflation
Primary balance

CFA zone
5.4
-1.5

NCFA
8.9
-0.2

Others
26.2
-2.8

The table shows that countries with flexible or floating regime have the highest
deficit, followed by the CFA zone, and the NCFA countries. Therefore, using the
intuition of CCD, NCFA should have the lowest price level. But the larger deficit of the
CFA zone is likely mitigated by the monetary union, which stabilizes the price level. The
14

The inflation average of the last group (other) does not include the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC), and Angola. DRC and Angola are not included because of their higher inflation over the period.
Sao Tome and Principe, Madagascar, and Mauritius are not included because I grouped the countries
according to location and these countries are islands. Lastly, Guinea-Bissau is not included because in 1997
it joined the CFA zone

55

last group (Others) likely follows the FTPL view (even the problem of observational
equivalence remains) because it has the highest price level among the three group. This
raises the question that economists have asked, and attempted to answer, for several years
now: do the advantages of a stable inflation rate outweigh the cost of a fiscal deficit?
The problem of fiscal deficits has many roots in SSA countries. Identifying those
roots is beyond the scope of my thesis. However, with some of the pieces already
mentioned above, it is possible to argue historically, at least from the standpoint of
countries in the CFA franc zones, that the devaluation of their currency in 1994
contributed to perpetuating this deficit. Evidently, this cannot be the only reason, because
even before that, these countries ran a deficit. In international markets, imports and
exports of these countries were already suffering from problems already mentioned
above. But this is just one component of this deficit problem rampant in SSA countries,
whether they are in a monetary union or not. Institutional, political, and social issues
plague these countries and lead to poor fiscal and monetary decisions. But my work is
focused on the price level, so in summary, countries in monetary unions seem to have a
better handle on their inflation than their counterparts.

4.4.2 Seigniorage and the Reserve of Money
Countries that run a persistent fiscal deficit tend to resort to money creation over
time in order to finance it. The percentage of seigniorage is the monetary aggregate that
reveals the ratio of money creation with respect to GDP in a country. The reserve of
money is the amount of money that the government uses to service its debt when an
urgent payment is required. It is also a ratio to the GDP of the country and it is measured
by the ratio of the change in reserve of money to the gross domestic product using current
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prices. Therefore, countries with a disciplined governments have a lower seigniorage and
higher reserve of money to GDP ratio. Table 9 lists the average of these two aggregates
for all the groups.
TABLE 13: SUMMARY OF SEIGNIORAGE AVERAGES15

Seigniorage
Reserve of money

CFA
0.73
10.07

NCFA
1.25
12.22

Others
1.72
9.21

The Franc zone is governed by five fundamental principles: convertibility into
French francs at a fixed parity, guarantee of convertibility by France through the
establishment of “operations accounts” for each colonial central bank with the French
Treasury, free capital mobility throughout the zone, pooling of most foreign exchange
reserves at the French Treasury, and establishment of a common trade and financial
policy vis-à-vis the rest of the world (Boughton, 1991). The three central banks of the
zone (Central Bank of Comoros included) are required to deposit part of their foreign
exchange reserves in an operating account with the French Treasury (banque de France).
These principles explain the lower percentage of the seigniorage in the CFA zone. In
countries with a floating exchange rate, the percentage of seigniorage is more than twice
that of the CFA zone. The countries in the non-CFA fixed regime seemed to be more
disciplined than the countries with a flexible regime. A higher percentage of seigniorage
is an indication that the country is likely to resort to money creation to cover the deficit.
Countries in the floating regime have the lowest average reserve of money in this
table while non-CFA countries have the highest average. The principles of the CFA terms
with France could explain the averages of the countries in this monetary union. The
15

The CFA zone in this table does not include Equatorial Guinea because of the lack of data. In the last
group (other), Guinea and Mozambique are also not included because there was not enough data.
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higher the percentage of the reserve of money, the easier it is for a country to pay its
liabilities when the need arises. Therefore, non-CFA fixed countries having the highest
percentage of reserve money means that they have the highest percentage of assets to pay
their liabilities. The last group, with the lowest average, has a limited capability to pay
their liabilities.
In the next chapter, I apply the methodology to SSA-country data and determine
what regime these countries fall under. If there is not enough data to run VAR analysis, I
will use the history of the country to argue for one regime or the other. Additionally, I run
a structural break test to determine if there was a significant break in the data, and study
the data before and after the break year.
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Chapter 5: Results
Building on Ribeiro and Baldini (2008), I reproduce their results and add
structural break tests. However, because neither they nor I have all the data necessary to
run a VAR analysis on all countries, I separate the countries into two groups: those for
which I have sufficient data, and those for which I do not. Among the countries with
sufficient data, some countries do not have a significant break while others do. For the
rest of the countries, I use a historical approach to argue which regime they fall under. In
other words, because most SSA countries gained their independence around the same
time, the largest differences between them reside within their political and social
climates.

5.1 Countries with sufficient data for VAR analysis
Out of the 43 countries that Ribeiro and Baldini use in their analysis, only 22 have
enough surplus and liabilities data to run a VAR analysis. I use their data to run the same
analysis, and add to it the structural break test, in order to determine if the country
experienced a significant break in the path of inflation rates. I use Stata to run the break
test analysis, and SAS to run the VAR analysis. Table 13 contains the list of countries in
this group along with their break test results, their p-values, and Ribeiro and Baldini’s
(B&R) results. As I indicated in the previous chapter, whenever a country has a
significant break year, I split the data of the country into two subsets, before and after the
break year, and study each individually. I run the VAR analysis for each data set and use
the criteria described in the previous chapter to determine which regime the country is
under, and whether or not it switched. If the estimated break year is not significant, I run
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the VAR regression for the whole entire period, and demonstrate that my results concur
with Baldini and Ribeiro’s.

TABLE 14: COUNTRIES WITH SUFFICIENT DATA FOR VAR ANALYSIS
Countries

B&R result (19802005)

Statistic

p-value

Exchange rate Regime

Estimated break year

Botswana

FD

6.62

0.5759

NCFA

1998

Burundi

FD

12.35

0.0907

Others

1998

Cameroon

MD

11.36

0.1314

CFA

1996

Ethiopia

NI

4.34

0.8805

Others

1988

Ghana

NI

26.69

0.0002

Others

1986

Kenya

MD

14.89

0.0332

Others

1994

Lesotho

NI

18.19

0.0082

NCFA

1993

Mali

NI

3.01

0.9742

CFA

1986

Malawi

NI

4.41

0.8735

Others

1996

Mauritius

NI

5.83

0.6865

Others

1992

Nigeria

MD

8.51

0.3429

Others

1993

Rwanda

MD

11.69

0.1162

Others

1996

Seychelles

NI

0.5026

0.5026

NCFA

1999

Senegal

NI

5.65

0.7114

CFA

1986

Sierra Leone

NI

19.11

0.0054

Others

1989

South Africa

MD

16.77

0.0151

Others

1993

Swaziland

NI

11.86

0.1093

NCFA

1989

Tanzania

FD

26.22

0.0002

Others

1995

Togo

NI

2.29

0.9989

CFA

1994

Uganda

NI

23.53

0.0007

Others

1986

Zambia

NI

32.47

0.0000

Others

1994

Zimbabwe

FD

11.05

0.1467

Others

2001

The table above includes only 9 countries with an identified regime, and only three of
those have a significant break year, Kenya, South African, and Tanzania. Therefore,
because the goal of my thesis is to find switches in regimes, I focus on those three first,
Kenya (1994), South Africa (1993), and Tanzania (1995). Then I move to the other six.
Finally, I divide the last 13 countries into two groups as well: those with a significant
break year, and those without one.
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5.1.1 Countries with an identified regime, and a significant break year
5.1.1.1 KENYA

As I mentioned previously, Ribeiro and Baldini identify Kenya as a country under a
monetary dominant regime between 1980 and 2005. Using VAR, I find the same result,
as shown in Figure 19 and Table 14.
FIGURE 19: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN KENYA BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005

TABLE 15: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN KENYA BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
KEN_s l1ken_s l2ken_s l3ken_s l4ken_s l5ken_s
KEN_s 1.00000 0.75859 0.46502 0.25897 0.10274 0.03959
KEN_s
<.0001 0.0220 0.2328 0.6491 0.8647

The negative impulse response of the liabilities (Ken_w), and the positive correlation
between surpluses, lead me to conclude that Kenya is under a monetary dominant regime.
In other words, during the period of study, the surplus is used to reduce the government.
A test for a break in the inflation process reveals a break in 1994. The impulse responses
before and after the break year are shown in Figure 20.
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FIGURE 20: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN KENYA BEFORE AND AFTER 1994
Before the break (1980-1994)

After the break (1994-2005)

TABLE 16: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN KENYA BEFORE 1994
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations

KEN_s
KEN_s

KEN_s l1ken_s l2ken_s l3ken_s l4ken_s l5ken_s
1.00000 0.66393 0.18758 0.33162 0.27962 0.17410
0.0133 0.5594 0.3191 0.4340
0.6542

TABLE 17: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN KENYA AFTER 1994
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
KEN_s l1ken_s l2ken_s l3ken_s l4ken_s l5ken_s
KEN_s 1.00000 0.67504 0.57109 0.61475 0.64999 0.41995
KEN_s
0.0227 0.0846 0.0781 0.0810 0.3482

Figure 20, and Tables 15 and 16 reveal a change in the impulse response of liabilities.
Before 1994, the response is negative, indicating a monetary dominant regime. But after
the break year, the response changes to positive, indicating a fiscally dominant regime. In
the inflation data there is a drop in inflation rate from 28.814 percent in 1993, to 1.554 in
1994. The reason why Baldini and Ribeiro find a monetary dominant regime is most
likely because the negative response before the break year is larger in value
(approximately -50), than the positive response after the break year (approximately +3).
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In other words, the combined response when the whole period is analyzed without
considering the break year reveals a monetary dominant regime. Therefore, I conclude
that after 1994, Kenya slowly switched to a fiscally dominant regime. Eleven years later,
in 2005, the impact of this regime has not yet cancelled the previous one, hence the
monetary dominant regime observed by Baldini and Ribeiro (2008). Before the break
year, the country was under a monetary regime, and the government used its surplus to
finance its debt. After the break year however, the response of liabilities becomes
positive, which means that the price decreases, but so do government liabilities.
5.1.1.2 SOUTH AFRICA

According to Ribeiro and Baldini, South Africa was in a monetary regime. My results do
not corroborate with this result.
FIGURE 21: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005

TABLE 18: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN SOUTH AFRICA BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
ZAF_s l1zaf_s l2zaf_s l3zaf_s l4zaf_s l5zaf_s
ZAF_s 1.00000 0.76706 0.44482 0.22085 0.15552 0.13609
ZAF_s
<.0001 0.0433 0.3494 0.5249 0.5903
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The initial response is positive (>0) and the surpluses are positively correlated (only two
periods have a significant coefficient). There is therefore a fiscally dominant regime in
South Africa during this period. The structural break year shows a significant break year
in 1993. Because there were not enough data to run the regression between 1993 and
2005, I start the second set in 1991, instead of 1993.
FIGURE 22: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA BEFORE AND AFTER 1993
Before break (1980-1993)

After break (1993-2005)

TABLE 19: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN SOUTH AFRICA BEFORE 1993
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
ZAF_s l1zaf_s l2zaf_s l3zaf_s l4zaf_s l5zaf_s
ZAF_s 1.00000 0.47610 -0.01040 -0.35389 -0.30655 -0.09733
ZAF_s
0.1177 0.9758 0.3157 0.4224 0.8187

TABLE 20: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN SOUTH AFRICAN AFTER 1993
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
ZAF_s l1zaf_s l2zaf_s l3zaf_s l4zaf_s l5zaf_s
ZAF_s 1.00000 0.90127 0.77814 0.75530 0.73854 0.06944
ZAF_s
0.0009 0.0230 0.0496 0.0936 0.9117
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The initial response in the liabilities (ZAF_w) before the break is negative, but the
relationship between the surpluses is not always positive. The country was therefore
under an unidentified regime, even though the p-values are insignificant. After the break
however, the autocorrelations of surpluses become significantly positive, and the impulse
response is initially positive. Therefore, although the coefficients are only significant for
three periods, I conclude that South Africa switched to a fiscally dominant regime after
1993. South Africa therefore went from a non-identified regime to a fiscally dominant
regime.
5.1.1.3 TANZANIA

The structural break year of Tanzania is 1995. Additionally, according to Ribeiro and
Baldini (2008), throughout the whole period, Tanzania is identified as a country under a
fiscally dominant regime. The VAR result is shown in Figure 23.
FIGURE 23: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN TANZANIA BETWEEN 1980-2005

TABLE 21: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN TANZANIA BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
TZA_s l1tza_s l2tza_s l3tza_s l4tza_s l5tza_s
TZA_s 1.00000 0.74404 0.57586 0.35340 0.02618 -0.00136
TZA_s
0.0003 0.0124 0.1641 0.9233 0.9962
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The negative coefficient in the last period is indicative of a non-identified regime, though
not significant. This result is confirmed when I run the structural break test. Because
there are no data after 1999, I start the second set in 1991, instead of 1995. So, the first
data set is between 1980 and 1995, and the second data is between 1991 and 1999. The
results are shown below:
FIGURE 24: IMPULSE RESPONSE LIABILITIES IN TANZANIA BEFORE AND AFTER 1995
Before the break (1980-1995)

After the break (1991-1999)

TABLE 22: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN TANZANIA BEFORE 1995
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
TZA_s l1tza_s l2tza_s l3tza_s l4tza_s l5tza_s
TZA_s 1.00000 0.76256 0.61913 0.54693 0.35923 0.56630
TZA_s
0.0015 0.0240 0.0657 0.2779 0.0879

TABLE 23: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN TANZANIA AFTER 1995
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
TZA_s l1tza_s l2tza_s l3tza_s l4tza_s l5tza_s
TZA_s 1.00000 0.46747 0.36890 0.14662 -0.15757 0.92049
TZA_s
0.2428 0.4155 0.7816 0.8002 0.0795
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The impulse responses above show that liabilities in Tanzania before and after the break
year are positive. After the break year, Table 22 shows an insignificant negative
autocorrelation in period four. This leads me to conclude that Tanzania remained under a
monetary dominant regime throughout the period of study. Tanzania did not switch
regime after 1995.
5.1.2 Countries with an identified regime, and an insignificant break year
The countries in this group include Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Nigeria, Rwanda, and
Zimbabwe. Cameroon is in the CFA zone while Botswana is a NCFA fixed exchange rate
country. The remaining countries are in the last group, so they either have a floating rate
regime.
5.1.2.1 BOTSWANA

Botswana is under a fiscally dominant regime during this period. The VAR analysis
confirms it with the positive response of liabilities and the positive correlation of
surpluses;
FIGURE 25: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN BOTSWANA BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005

TABLE 24: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN BOTSWANA BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005
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Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
BWA_s l1bwa_s l2bwa_s l3bwa_s l4bwa_s l5bwa_s
BWA_s 1.00000 0.63147 0.15002 0.24381 0.51181 0.62471
BWA_s
0.0012 0.5052 0.2869 0.0211 0.0042

The structural break test on Botswana data detects a break year in 1998, but it is not
significant (p-value=0.57). Therefore, I do not investigate further; rather I conclude that
Botswana is under a fiscally dominant regime during the period of study.
5.1.2.2 CAMEROON

Cameroon (my home country) and has experienced relative peace since its independence
from France on May 20th, 1960. In 1988, there was almost a civil war after the results of
the elections revealed that the president at the time had lost. Thankfully, there was no
bloodshed. Since its independence, it has been part of the CFA. In fact, the central bank
of the CAMU (Central African Monetary Union) is based in Yaounde, the capital of
Cameroon. It is likely that the monetary dominant regime is because of the monetary
union. Figure 26 and Table 24 below shows the impulse response of liabilities
FIGURE 26: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN CAMEROON BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005
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TABLE 25: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN CAMEROON BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
CMR_s l1cmr_s l2cmr_s l3cmr_s l4cmr_s l5cmr_s
CMR_s 1.00000 0.62873 0.51327 0.51697 0.24387 0.21145
CMR_s
0.0010 0.0123 0.0138 0.2867 0.3708

The results above confirm the monetary dominance regime in Cameroon. The structural
break test found no break year. Therefore, I conclude that Cameroon is under a monetary
dominant regime between 1980 and 2005.
5.1.2.3 BURUNDI

Burundi is under a fiscally dominant regime according to Ribeiro and Baldini (2008)
during the period of study. My analysis arrives at the same result.
FIGURE 27: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN BURUNDI BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005

TABLE 26: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN BURUNDI BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
BDI_s l1bdi_s l2bdi_s l3bdi_s l4bdi_s l5bdi_s
BDI_s 1.00000 0.64404 0.37597 0.26474 0.30404 0.31906
BDI_s
0.0005 0.0702 0.2222 0.1689 0.1586
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The result in Figure 25 shows a positive initial response of liabilities to the shock in
surplus. The autocorrelation result shows that the surpluses are positively correlated, and
very significant for the first period, and significant at a 10 percent significance level in
the second period. I conclude that Burundi is under a fiscally dominant regime, which
means that the positive shock to the surplus does not lead to a decrease of the government
debt. There is no structural break in the inflation data of Burundi. Therefore, I conclude
that Burundi did not switch regime during the period of study.
5.1.2.4 NIGERIA

Nigeria uses a floating exchange rate regime. It is under a monetary dominant regime
during the period of study. The response of liabilities (NGA_w) in Figure 28 and the
correlation between surpluses in Table 26 demonstrate this.
FIGURE 28: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN NIGERIA BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005

TABLE 27: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN NIGERIA BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
NGA_s l1nga_s l2nga_s l3nga_s l4nga_s l5nga_s
NGA_s 1.00000 0.63142 0.33428 0.27502 0.49258 0.59991
NGA_s
0.0007 0.1104 0.2041 0.0199 0.0040
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The impulse response is negative, and the surpluses are positively correlated, indicative
of a fiscally dominant regime. The structural break test reveals a break year in 1993, with
a p-value of 0.34 which is insignificant. Therefore, Nigeria is under a monetary dominant
regime over the whole entire period.
5.1.2.5 RWANDA

Rwanda is under a monetary dominant regime during this period. Its impulse response
and autocorrelation results are Figure 29 and Table 27.
FIGURE 29: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN RWANDA BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005

TABLE 28: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN RWANDA BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
RWA_s l1rwa_s l2rwa_s l3rwa_s l4rwa_s l5rwa_s l6rwa_s
RWA_s 1.00000 0.51150 0.47783 0.25907 0.30890 0.16904 0.18975
RWA_s
0.0106 0.0211 0.2443 0.1730 0.4762 0.4365

The response of liabilities is negative and the autocorrelations are positive for 5 periods
(though only two are significant). This is indicative of a monetary dominant regime.
There structural break analysis does not detect a break year in Rwanda during this period.
Therefore, Rwanda remained under a monetary dominant regime throughout the whole
twenty-six years.
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5.1.2.6 ZIMBABWE

Zimbabwe is the last country with an identified regime and available data to perform a
VAR analysis. It is under a fiscally dominant regime according to Baldini and Ribeiro
(2008).
FIGURE 30: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN ZIMBABWE BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005

TABLE 29: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN ZIMBABWE BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
ZWE_s l1zwe_s l2zwe_s l3zwe_s l4zwe_s l5zwe_s
ZWE_s 1.00000 0.57468 0.62909 0.58024 0.64760 0.62601
ZWE_s
0.0027 0.0010 0.0037 0.0011 0.0024

The positive response and the significant positive correlation between the surpluses
confirm the fiscal dominance. There is no significant break year in Zimbabwe during this
period. However, because of the recent news of inflation in Zimbabwe, I decided to look
further into its recent inflation rates. According to Pindiriri (2012), between 1999 and
2008, Zimbabwe experienced one of the worst macroeconomic performances in the
world. The country recorded negative real GDP growth during this period, compounded
with an extreme currency depreciation, persistent droughts, and a record hyperinflation,
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which reached over 2 million percent (Pindiriri, 2012, p.2). Furthermore, Pindiriri adds
that the CPI inflation rate was 12.5 million, and the growth rate was 6,723 percent in
2007. Broad money supply grew by over 64 thousand percent in 2007 and 2008. Prices
changed on an hourly basis in 2008. In fact, the price of a good could change twice while
one was still in the queue to purchase it. As a result of these extreme macroeconomic
numbers, in 2009, the economy was dollarized. In other words, the local currency ceased
to be the medium of exchange. It was replaced by the US dollar and the Rand (South
Africa’s currency) as the official currencies in the country.
After the dollarization of the economy, the economy started to show signs of
recovery. Hyperinflation was eliminated; broad money supply and inflation monthly
growth rates, which were above 100 thousand percent and 1 million percent in 2008,
significantly dropped to growth rates below 30 percent and 2 percent, respectively. The
country’s GDP began to grow from -10 percent in 2008, to 5.7 percent in 2009, 8.1
percent in 2010, and to about 9.3 percent in 2011 (Pindiriri, 2012). The country therefore
began to display signs of inflation stability. The data I have for Zimbabwe does not cover
this period. So, it is possible that 2009 was a significant break year for the country’s
economy. But the fiscal dominance regime result that I find in this study explains these
extreme periods of inflation. When a country is under a FD regime, its central bank is
usually not independent, which means seigniorage is likely to increase. For example,
Pindiri notes that in the last quarter of 1997, M1 (notes and coins) in Zimbabwe more
than doubled from 21.4 percent in September to 47.7 percent in December (Pindiriri,
2012 p.2).
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5.1.3 Countries with a Non-Identified Regime, and a Significant Break Year
Table 1 lists 5 countries that fit this category: Ghana, Lesotho, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and
Zambia. For each of the countries, I perform the VAR analysis, and report the impulse
response and surplus autocorrelations before and after the break. When there is a change
in regime, I proffer a qualitative argument why the switch occurred, and why it was
significant. I group these countries in pairs.
5.1.3.1 GHANA

Baldini and Ribeiro identify Ghana as a country under a non-identified regime. My
results however, find a monetary dominant regime. The impulse response is negative, and
the autocorrelations are positive for 4 periods. The last period has a negative
autocorrelation but is not significant. I arrive at Baldini and Ribeiro’s result only when I
increase the number of periods to 7, as shown in Table 29, because the negative
autocorrelation becomes significant. But, I conclude that Ghana is under a monetary
regime during this period.
FIGURE 31: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN GHANA BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005

TABLE 30: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN GHANA BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005
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Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
GHA_s l1gha_s l2gha_s l3gha_s l4gha_s l5gha_s l6gha_s l7gha_s
GHA_s 1.00000 0.71618 0.44721 0.29985 0.05896 -0.19293 -0.38700 -0.50107
GHA_s
<.0001 0.0324 0.1752 0.7996 0.4151 0.1017 0.0342

While the p-value of the first and second lags are significant, the seventh lag also has a
significant result, with a negative coefficient. Therefore, it confirms Ribeiro and Baldini’s
result that Ghana’s regime is non-identified. The structural break test shows a significant
break year in 1986, with a p-value of 0.0002. Therefore, I split the data into two subsets.
The first subset only has 6 data points, therefore, I increase it to 1989 in order to run the
VAR analysis. But I start the second subset in 1986, and end it in 2005.
FIGURE 32: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN GHANA BEFORE 1986

TABLE 31: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN GHANA BEFORE 1986
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
GHA_s l1gha_s l2gha_s l3gha_s l4gha_s l5gha_s l6gha_s l7gha_s
GHA_s 1.00000 0.93668 0.86743 0.57809 0.30384 0.59950 -0.88478 1.00000
GHA_s
0.0006 0.0114 0.2295 0.6192 0.4005 0.3086
.

This result is indicative of a monetary dominant regime. The impulse responses of
liabilities, GHA_W, is negative after a positive shock to the surplus, and surpluses are
positively correlated for 5 periods, two of them being significant. After the break,
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however, the surpluses become negatively correlated, and the impulse response stays the
same
FIGURE 33: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN GHANA AFTER 1986

TABLE 32: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN GHANA AFTER 1986
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
GHA_s l1gha_s l2gha_s l3gha_s l4gha_s l5gha_s l6gha_s l7gha_s
GHA_s 1.00000 0.70345 0.47265 0.38140 0.10294 -0.23029 -0.38427 -0.56142
GHA_s
0.0011 0.0554 0.1449 0.7151 0.4283 0.1948 0.0575

The negative correlation between surpluses is growing in significance. Before the break
year, the country is under a monetary dominant regime. But after, it switches to an
unidentifiable, though the fifth period is not significant. I turn to history for an
explanation.
According John Loxley (1990), Ghana is one of two countries (Zambia) that experienced
severe crises dating back into the 1970s. It experienced steadily falling per capita
incomes, an erosion of foreign exchange earnings with a consequent contraction in real
import capacity, and severe budgetary problems. Loxley notes that the causes were partly
external, because terms of trade moved sharply against Ghana. Additionally, export
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demand fell in the early 1980s, and droughts caused havoc in 1983. However, in 1983,
Ghana adopted adjustment programs of the IMF and the World Bank. According to
Loxley, Ghana is a success story of those programs. Therefore, the significant break year
is likely to be the result of the adjustment programs because it brought with it changes in
economic policy. However, Loxley goes on to argue that the relative success of the
Ghana program may not be sustainable. The inconclusive result after the break likely
points to some truth in that argument. It appears that, while Ghana has moved away from
a fiscally dominant regime, it has not completely made its way to a monetary dominant
regime yet.
5.1.3.2 LESOTHO

Lesotho has a non-identified regime as well. This result is clearly observable from the
impulse response and the autocorrelation results in Figure 34 and Table 32 respectively.
FIGURE 34: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN LESOTHO BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005

TABLE 33: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
LSO_s l1lso_s l2lso_s l3lso_s l4lso_s l5lso_s l6lso_s l7lso_s
LSO_s 1.00000 0.59807 0.35260 0.13586 -0.16760 -0.48901 -0.65382 -0.45679
LSO_s
0.0042 0.1273 0.5792 0.5062 0.0464 0.0060 0.0870
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The impulse response is negative, but the correlation between surpluses changes signs
significantly. Therefore, the country is under a non-identified regime. The structural
break test detected a significant break year in 1993 (p-value = 0.0082). Therefore, I split
the data into two to see if a change of regime occurs.
FIGURE 35: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN LESOTHO BEFORE 1993

TABLE 34: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN LESOTHO BEFORE 1993
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
LSO_s l1lso_s l2lso_s l3lso_s l4lso_s l5lso_s l6lso_s
LSO_s 1.00000 0.64419 0.17217 -0.60720 -0.87125 -0.63802 -0.36123
LSO_s
0.0847 0.7120 0.2011 0.0544 0.3620 0.7647

This result is inconclusive because the autocorrelation changes sign, even though the
impulse response is statistically insignificantly different from zero.
FIGURE 36: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN LESOTHO AFTER 1993
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TABLE 35: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN LESOTHO AFTER 1993
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
LSO_s l1lso_s l2lso_s l3lso_s l4lso_s l5lso_s l6lso_s l7lso_s
LSO_s 1.00000 0.41031 0.11258 0.01024 -0.32997 -0.66974 -0.63501 -0.81701
LSO_s
0.1852 0.7417 0.9776 0.3858 0.0692 0.1255 0.0472

The initial response is now negative, but the correlation between surpluses continues to
change signs. Therefore, the regime remains non-identified before and after the break
date. While I can argue that after the break year, the initial impulse response in Fig. 36 is
more negative than before the break year, I did not understand why this year was so
significant until I turned to its history. A ccording to Mokoa (2004), it was in 1993 that
constitutional rule returned in Lesotho, and popular elections as formulae for distributing
power and appointing rulers were reinstated. Prior to 1993, the post-independence
president, Chief Jonathan, had cancelled the first elections, which he had lost to his rival,
Ntsu Mokehehle. From 1966, the year of its independence, through 1993, the country
remained a one-party rule, and constitutionalism was barely able to take root within the
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Lesotho polity according to Mokoa (2004). I conclude therefore that the country is still in
economic transition between 1980 and 2005, which is why the regime is non-identified.
5.1.3.3 SIERRA LEONE

According to Ribeiro and Baldini, Sierra Leone is under a non-identified regime. The
VAR analysis that I run finds that same result.
FIGURE 37: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN SIERRA LEONE BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005

TABLE 36: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN SIERRA LEONE BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
SLE_s l1sle_s l2sle_s l3sle_s l4sle_s l5sle_s l6sle_s l7sle_s
SLE_s 1.00000 0.50806 0.32997 0.38635 -0.00066 -0.02861 -0.30712 -0.58864
SLE_s
0.0113 0.1241 0.0757 0.9977 0.9047 0.2009 0.0102

The initial response is negative, and the surpluses change signs, which means that the
regime cannot be identified. The structural break test detects a significant break year in
1989 (p-value=0.0054). I can therefore analyze the data before and after the break year;
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FIGURE 38: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN SIERRA LEONE BEFORE 1989

TABLE 37: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN SIERRA LEONE BEFORE 1989
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
SLE_s l1sle_s l2sle_s l3sle_s l4sle_s l5sle_s l6sle_s l7sle_s
SLE_s 1.00000 0.81186 0.79188 0.83853 0.79315 0.81848 0.95640 1.00000
SLE_s
0.0144 0.0338 0.0370 0.1094 0.1815 0.1887
.

Figure 38 reveals no response of liabilities to the surplus shock and Table 36 indicates a
positive correlation between surpluses, which in indicative of a fiscally dominant regime.
For at least the first three lags, the positive correlation of surpluses is significant.
FIGURE 39: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN SIERRA LEONE AFTER 1989
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TABLE 38: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN SIERRA LEONE AFTER 1989
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
SLE_s l1sle_s l2sle_s l3sle_s l4sle_s l5sle_s l6sle_s l7sle_s
SLE_s 1.00000 -0.03463 0.20123 0.28668 -0.30285 0.06121 -0.40583 -0.47135
SLE_s
0.9025 0.4903 0.3423 0.3387 0.8581 0.2446 0.2003

After the break year, the initial response because negative, but the surpluses are no longer
positively correlated. In other the words, the country went from being under a fiscally
dominant regime to a non-identified regime. Additionally, the initial response is
considerably below zero, while before the break it was above zero. Historically speaking,
this loss of discipline closely coincides with the civil war in Sierra Leone that started in
1991, and lasted until 2002. An estimated 50 thousand were killed, over one million were
removed from their homes, and thousands more were victims of brutal amputations,
rapes, and assaults (Bellows and Edward, 2006).
5.1.3.4 UGANDA

The results of Uganda’s analysis are somewhat ambiguous. Ribeiro and Baldini obtained
a non-identified regime for this country, but my results seem to show a fiscally dominant
regime. Here is my analysis.
FIGURE 40: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN UGANDA BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005

TABLE 39: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN UGANDA BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005
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Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
UGA_s l1uga_s l2uga_s l3uga_s l4uga_s l5uga_s l6uga_s l7uga_s
UGA_s 1.00000 0.99339 0.98061 0.95326 0.93816 0.90231 0.84157 0.70804
UGA_s
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0007

The results above indicate a fiscally dominant regime. The initial response of liabilities is
positive, and the correlation between the surpluses are significantly positive. The
structural break test finds a significant break year in 1986 (p-value=0.0007). I increase
the data set before the break to 1990 in order to run the VAR analysis;
FIGURE 41: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN UGANDA BEFORE 1986

TABLE 40: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN UGANDA BEFORE 1986
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
UGA_s l1uga_s l2uga_s l3uga_s l4uga_s l5uga_s l6uga_s l7uga_s
UGA_s 1.00000 0.99334 0.98424 0.96357 0.96723 0.96438 0.98571 0.94106
UGA_s
<.0001 <.0001 0.0005 0.0016 0.0080 0.0143 0.2197

The result before the break indicates a fiscally dominant regime. The impulse response of
liabilities (UGA_w), appears to be zero, and the surpluses are positively correlated.
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FIGURE 42: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN UGANDA AFTER 1986

TABLE 41: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN UGANDA AFTER 1986
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
UGA_s l1uga_s l2uga_s l3uga_s l4uga_s l5uga_s l6uga_s l7uga_s
UGA_s 1.00000 0.79846 0.44858 0.25927 0.02323 -0.12992 -0.29842 0.13567
UGA_s
<.0001 0.0619 0.3149 0.9319 0.6445 0.3000 0.6585

The results in Figure 42 and Table 40 indicate a fiscally dominant regime after the break
year. After period 5, the autocorrelations are not significant. I conclude therefore that
Uganda did not switch regime during the period of study. It remained under a fiscally
dominant regime. There is also a historical setting for this break year because in 1986, the
civil war in Uganda between guerrillas of the National Resistance Army (NRA) and the
government of Milton Obote, ended (Schubert, 2006). The country with this result is
under a fiscally dominant regime. regime.
5.1.3.5 ZAMBIA

Zambia also has a non-identified regime, according to Ribeiro and Baldini (2008). My
results disagree with theirs. My VAR result is shown in Figure 43 and Table 41.

84
FIGURE 43: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN ZAMBIA BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005

TABLE 42: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN ZAMBIA BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
ZMB_s l1zmb_s l2zmb_s l3zmb_s l4zmb_s l5zmb_s l6zmb_s l7zmb_s
ZMB_s 1.00000 0.71889 0.57513 0.61139 0.62228 0.54464 0.28580 0.28743
ZMB_s
0.0001 0.0051 0.0032 0.0034 0.0159 0.2503 0.2633

The results above indicate a monetary dominant regime. The response of liabilities is
initially negative after the shock, and the surpluses are positively correlated for the first 5
lags. However, when the structural break test detects a significant break year in 1994 (pvalue=0.0000), and I analyze the two data set before and after the break, the results are
inconclusive.
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FIGURE 44: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN ZAMBIA BEFORE 1994

TABLE 43: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN ZAMBIA BEFORE 1994
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
ZMB_s l1zmb_s l2zmb_s l3zmb_s l4zmb_s l5zmb_s l6zmb_s l7zmb_s
ZMB_s 1.00000 0.55899 0.35388 0.46733 0.49889 0.22315 -0.12976 0.00477
ZMB_s
0.0588 0.2857 0.1732 0.1716 0.5953 0.7816 0.9928

The impulse response is negative, and the surpluses again are positively correlated for the
first 5 lags which means that the country is under a monetary dominant regime.
FIGURE 45: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN ZAMBIA AFTER 1994
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TABLE 44: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN ZAMBIA AFTER 1994
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
ZMB_s l1zmb_s l2zmb_s l3zmb_s l4zmb_s l5zmb_s l6zmb_s l7zmb_s
ZMB_s 1.00000 0.23818 -0.02490 -0.42175 -0.49997 -0.27969 -0.24692 0.75685
ZMB_s
0.5075 0.9493 0.2980 0.2532 0.5914 0.6888 0.2432

After the break year, however, the response is now positive, but the surpluses are no
longer positively correlated. In other words, the regime is now non-identified. Using the
break test, I conclude that there is a regime switch in Zambia after 1994. As to the reason
why, I turn to its history.
At its independence in 1964, Zambia was a country with a bright future, and
substantial agricultural and mineral natural resources. However, poverty was extremely
high and the new government had a major challenge to address the large inequalities that
existed in the distribution of income. After multiple failures to address these challenges in
the following ten years, the country faced a collapsing copper price in 1975, and the
severe repercussions of the first oil shock. The collapse of the price of copper was
initially thought to be temporary, but by the early 1980s, it was becoming apparent that
attempts at reform had not been successful. A Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) was
attempted during the years 1983 through 1985 between Zambia and the IMF/World
Bank, with strong conditions attached (McCulloch, Baulch, and Cherel-Robson, 2001).
The agreement was however abandoned by the Zambian government, and it re-imposed
numerous controls in May 1987 after political discontent resulted in food riots in the
Copperbeltat the end of 1986.16 The continuing decline of the economy forced the
government to enter into fresh negotiations with the IMF. In early 1990, a new policy

16

The Copperbelt is a region of Central Africa running through northern Zambia and the souther
Democratic Republic of Congo known for copper mining
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framework was drawn up between the Zambian government and the IMF outlining the
economic policies to be pursued between 1990 and 1993. As part of that framework, the
government increased the price of high- grade maize meal by over 100 percent.
Widespread rioting ensued in Lusaka, the capital, and the major Copperbelt towns.
In March 1991, Zambia resumed normal relations with the World Bank, and the
IMF’s Rights Accumulation Programme commenced the following month effectively
enabling Zambia to reschedule its debts to the IMF. However, 1991 was an election year,
which undermined the government’s commitment to implement painful reforms; hence
the government’s request to the IMF to postpone a scheduled round of reduction of maize
meal subsidies. The IMF refused and suspended all financial disbursements to Zambia.
As a result, inflation rose sharply as the government printed money to fund civil service,
pay increases, and the election campaign. Inflation rates reached a peak of 186.26 percent
in 1993 (McCulloch et al, 2000 p. 3). A combination of high real interest rates on
Zambian treasury bills along with the implementation of cash budgeting and tight
monetary policy reduced inflation from about 55 percent in 1994 to about 25 percent in
1998. The significant break year is therefore set within this era of reform in Zambia, and
explains the period of transition.
5.1.4 Countries with a Non-Identified Regime, and an Insignificant Break Year
The last group of countries in Table 1 has sufficient data to run a VAR analysis but do
not have an identified regime according to Ribeiro and Baldini. Additionally, the
structural break test on their inflation data did not detect a significant break year. This
group of countries includes: Ethiopia, Mali, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Senegal,
Swaziland, and Togo. Mali, Senegal, and Togo are in the CFA zone, therefore I study
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them together. Mauritius and Seychelles islands are in a different group; and Ethiopia,
Malawi and Swaziland are in the last group.
5.1.4.1 MALI, SENEGAL, AND TOGO

The VAR analysis of Mali corroborates the results of Ribeiro and Baldini of a nonidentified regime. There is not a break year in Mali during the period of study. The results
of the VAR analysis are in Figure 46 and Table 44.
FIGURE 46: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN MALI BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005

TABLE 45: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN MALI BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
MLI_s l1mli_s l2mli_s l3mli_s l4mli_s l5mli_s l6mli_s l7mli_s l8mli_s
MLI_s 1.00000 0.16749 0.09591 0.00968 -0.18621 0.14758 0.28975 0.50529 -0.25389
MLI_s
0.4680 0.6875 0.9686 0.4594 0.5719 0.2764 0.0547 0.3811

While the impulse response is negative, the surpluses switch signs, which leads me to
conclude that Mali’s regime is non-identified. Similarly, Senegal’s regime is nonidentified for the same reasons.
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FIGURE 47: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN SENEGAL BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005

TABLE 46: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN SENEGAL BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
SEN_s l1sen_s l2sen_s l3sen_s l4sen_s l5sen_s
SEN_s 1.00000 0.25430 0.05879 0.36052 -0.12751 0.01483
SEN_s
0.2305 0.7899 0.0993 0.5818 0.9505

The surpluses are not positively correlated for all 5 periods. Therefore, the regime is nonidentified. The break test did not detect a break year in Senegal’s inflation data.
Therefore, I conclude that there was no significant change in regime in the country’s
regime.
Lastly, Togo’s break year is 1994, the same year the CFA franc was devalued.
Over the entire period Ribeiro and Baldini classify Togo as a country under a nonidentified regime. My result concurs with theirs.
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FIGURE 48: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN TOGO BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005

TABLE 47: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN TOGO BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
TGO_s l1tgo_s l2tgo_s l3tgo_s l4tgo_s l5tgo_s
TGO_s 1.00000 0.30931 -0.12850 -0.19498 -0.10882 0.33729
TGO_s
0.1324 0.5496 0.3726 0.6298 0.1349

The impulse response is positive, but the surpluses are mostly negatively correlated.
5.1.4.2 MAURITIUS AND SEYCHELLES

Mauritius is an island off the coast of the south of Africa. In Ribeiro and Baldini’s
analysis, it is a country under a non-identified regime. My analysis arrives at the same
conclusion.
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FIGURE 49: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN MAURITIUS BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005

TABLE 48: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN MAURITIUS BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations

MUS_s
MUS_s

MUS_s l1mus_s
1.000 0.8088
<.0001

l2mus_s
0.52468
0.0085

l3mus_s
0.22092
0.3111

l4mus_s l5mus_s l6mus_s l7mus_s
-0.08131 -0.2521
-0.376
-0.416
0.7191
0.2702 0.1024 0.0767

The surpluses are not positively correlated for at least 5 periods, so the regime in
unidentifiable. While the impulse response is negative, I cannot conclusively determine
which regime the country is under. The structural break test detects a break year in 1992,
but the result was not significant (p-value=0.6865). My analysis concludes then that the
Mauritius island remained under a non-identified regime throughout the whole period of
study.
Similarly, the island of Seychelles is under a non-identified regime despite a
negative initial value of the impulse response. The surpluses correlation also alternates
signs within the first 5 periods.
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FIGURE 50: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN SEYCHELLES BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005

TABLE 49: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN SEYCHELLES BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
SYC_s l1syc_s l2syc_s l3syc_s l4syc_s l5syc_s l6syc_s l7syc_s l8syc_s
SYC_s 1.00000 0.54327 0.37426 0.26572 0.22556 -0.12486 -0.42990 -0.48574 -0.57575
SYC_s
0.0061 0.0785 0.2320 0.3256 0.5999 0.0662 0.0410 0.0156

I increased the number of periods to confirm that the negative correlation between the
surpluses becomes negative, and it does. It leads me to conclude with Baldini and
Ribeiro, that this regime is non-identified. My analysis of the structural break revealed
that there a significant break year in 1999, although not significant (p-value=0.5026). I
conclude that there was no change in regime in the island of Seychelles either.
5.1.4.3 ETHIOPIA, MALAWI, AND SWAZILAND

This is the last group of countries in this section of countries with sufficient data, a nonidentified regime, and an insignificant break year. Their regime is non-identified
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according to Ribeiro and Baldini, and their impulse response differs from one country to
the other;
FIGURE 51: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN ETHIOPIA BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005

TABLE 50: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN ETHIOPIA BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
ETH_s l1eth_s l2eth_s l3eth_s l4eth_s l5eth_s
ETH_s 1.00000 0.00082 0.11330 -0.05627 -0.22326 -0.50127
ETH_s
0.9970 0.6067 0.8036 0.3306 0.0243

The impulse response is initially positive, but the surpluses are not positively correlated
for five periods. Therefore, the result is inconclusive in Ethiopia. It would seem however
that the country is headed toward a fiscally dominant regime. Ethiopia’s inflation
revealed no structural break year in the data. I conclude that the regime remained nonidentified throughout the period.
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FIGURE 52: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN MALAWI BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005

TABLE 51: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN MALAWI BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
MWI_s l1mwi_s l2mwi_s l3mwi_s l4mwi_s l5mwi_s
MWI_s 1.00000 -0.07484 0.00611 -0.07223 -0.02546 -0.11679
MWI_s
0.7538 0.9802 0.7758 0.9227 0.6667

Similarly, Malawi is under a non-identified regime, but its impulse response is initially
negative. The surpluses correlation alternate signs, however. Therefore, the result is
confirmed. There is no break year in Malawi during the period of study. Therefore, it is
under a non-identified regime.
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FIGURE 53: IMPULSE RESPONSE OF LIABILITIES IN SWAZILAND BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005

TABLE 52: AUTOCORRELATION OF SURPLUSES IN SWAZILAND BETWEEN 1980 AND 2005
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
SWZ_s l1swz_s l2swz_s l3swz_s l4swz_s l5swz_s l6swz_s l7swz_s l8swz_s
SWZ_s 1.00000 0.60434 0.19590 -0.02184 -0.22953 -0.13542 0.08750 -0.06042 -0.16303
SWZ_s
0.0023 0.3823 0.9251 0.3303 0.5804 0.7299 0.8178 0.5463

Swaziland is the only country in this last group under a non-CFA fixed exchange rate
regime. The analysis of its data is also inconclusive, as Figure 53 and Table 51 show. The
impulse response is initially positive, but the surpluses are not positively correlated for at
least 5 periods. Therefore, the regime is unidentifiable. There is no break year in
Swaziland during the period of study. I conclude that Swaziland remained under a nonidentified regime during the period 1980-2005.
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5.2 Countries with Insufficient Data for VAR Analysis
The last group of countries do not have sufficient surpluses and liabilities data to run a
VAR analysis. This group consists of 21 countries from Baldini and Ribeiro’s study. In
order to study them, therefore, I use their inflation rate history during the period of study,
and their social and political history to argue for either a monetary or a fiscally dominant
regime. Because the inflation data are the only data I need to run a structural break
analysis, I still have either a significant or an insignificant break year for each country.
Therefore, this section is divided into countries with a significant break year and
countries with an insignificant break year.

5.2.1 Countries with a significant break year
This group is made up of two countries in the CFA zone (Equatorial Guinea and GuineaBissau), and eighteen countries in the floating zone. In the following sections, I start with
the CFA countries, and then move on to the floating zone countries.
5.2.1.1 The CFA countries
There are only two countries in this category, Equatorial Guinea and Guinea-Bissau.
Table 52 contains the results of the break test.
TABLE 53: STRUCTURAL BREAK TEST RESULTS
Countries

Year

Statistics

p-value

Equatorial Guinea

1987

71.77

0.0000

Guinea-Bissau

1987

19.17

0.0053

A) EQUATORIAL GUINEA

Equatorial Guinea is a small country bordered by Cameroon in the north and
Gabon in the south. It is a member of the Central African Monetary Union (CAMU) of
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the CFA zone. After its independence from Spain in 1968, Equatorial Guinea’s economy
was centered on cocoa production, which provided 75 percent of the country’s GDP
(Frynas, 2004, p.528). During an 11-year dictatorship by its first president, Francisco
Macias Nguema (1968-79), the country turned into a pro-Soviet one-party state, which
led to a collapse of cocoa production, from some 28 thousand tons in 1969-70 to 4
thousand tons ten years later. During this reign, Frynas suggests that in just over a
decade, one-third of the population had either been killed or had left the country.
Nguema’s nephew, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, led a coup to dethrone him
successfully, although essentially the same family stayed in power. The cocoa sector
never recovered despite government efforts.
The country’s currency in the beginning of the 1980s was the bipkwele. A graph
of the country’s inflation gives a better understanding of the economic state during this
period.
FIGURE 54: INFLATION HISTORY OF EQUATORIAL GUINEA
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Figure 54 shows that there was significant change in 1985, when there was a drop in
inflation. This year corresponds to the year when the country joined the CFA franc zone
in central Africa. According to Ridell (1992), the same year, the country also adopted
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). These programs affected not only the lives of
all the inhabitants, but also the geographical composition of the nation. Four basic
elements are always present in SAPs: currency devaluation, the removal/reduction of the
state from the workings of the economy, the elimination of subsidies in an attempt to
reduce expenditures, and trade liberalization. These prerequisites aim at leading to the
adjustment of malfunctioning economies in order that they become viable components of
a global system. It is therefore possible to argue that the combined intended effects of
joining a monetary union along with the SAPs made the significant impact on inflation
that can be observed in Figure 58. The structural break year could have a similar rationale
behind it. The test revealed a break year in 1987, with a p-value of 0.0000. In other
words, this year was very significant for this country’s economy. I therefore argue that
the economy switched to a monetary dominant regime because of the requirement of the
monetary union. The only other significant inflation on this figure is that of 1995, when
the oil boom started in Equatorial Guinea. Otherwise, the country has seen a substantial
stable inflation since it joined the CFA zone.
B) GUINEA-BISSAU

Guinea-Bissau is a member of the West African Economic Monetary Union
(WAEMU) of the CFA zone. It is also a small country bordered by Senegal in the north,
and Guinea in the west and south. A look at its inflation history shows a considerable
drop in inflation rate between 1997 and 1998.
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FIGURE 55: INFLATION HISTORY OF GUINEA-BISSAU
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Between 1997 and 1998, the inflation rate in Guinea-Bissau went from 49.07
percent to 8.07 percent. This drop could be attributed to the country’s entry to the CFA
franc in 1997. The structural break test however, identified a significant break year in
1987 (p-value =0.0053). In order to understand why this year was more significant than
1997, a little bit of its economic history needs to be understood.
Guinea-Bissau had its independence in 1974. After being released from being a
Portuguese colony, the government tried to implement a centrally planned economic
system following the Soviet Union. In other words, it became isolationist, and was
extremely closed with minimum international trade. After multiple attempts at
industrialization with disastrous results, the agriculture was marked by backwardness and
low productivity according to Aguilar and Stenman (1997). The domestic market was
mostly characterized by monopolies and extensive and severe rationing. This economic
problem grew worse, and led to a political consensus in 1981 that the basic determinants
of the economy had to change. The consequence was a military coup replacing the
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president at the time, Mr. Cabral, with Mr. Joao Bernardo Vieira. Aftewards, the country
opened its economy, and restarted contacts with the World Bank and the IMF.
In 1983, with the partnership of these international institutions, an “Economic
Recovery Program” was introduced, which included measures aimed at restructuring and
reforming the economy. Negotiations with the IMF and the World Bank ensued, which
led to the first Structural Adjustment Program. A new “Plan of Economic Stabilization”
followed with the financial support of the IMF and the World Bank. Consequently,
Aguilar and Stenman note that the Guinean Peso was devalued, some prices were
deregulated, and a limited amount of private commercial activity was allowed probably
because the programs were still in their beginning stages. Three years later, however, in
1986, the country passed a decree to embrace fully a market-oriented economy. The
government issued decrees that liberalized the economy. Aguilar and Stenman note that,
for example, decree 22/86 liberalized trade, putting an end to the large state monopolies
on both domestic and international markets. Additionally, decree 23/86 established a
system of prices determined by market mechanisms, with the exception of some goods
considered to be of crucial importance to the population, such as imported rice and
gasoline. Therefore, for the first time since its independence, the country’s economy was
fully opened, with minimal barriers for the development of the private sector. These
reforms paved the way for an agreement with the IMF and the World Bank, for starting
the country’s first formal Structural Adjustment Program with the support of the
international institutions and the donors. Thus, 1987 was the year when the country fully
entered into the agreement, and the programs were implemented. For example, the
agreement in 1987 included a first three-year “Structural Adjustment Facility” amounting
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to 5.25 million SDRs.17 Furthermore, the World Bank contributed with its first
“Structural Adjustment Credit,” and was instrumental in mobilizing the donors for more
financial support for the program. It is very likely therefore, that this is why the structural
break test detected this economic reform as the most critical one in the country’s
economic history. Aguilar and Stenman (1997) as a result, highlight that with the
exception of the years 1992 and 1993, the economy of Guinea-Bissau has had an average
growth rate of 3.3 percent per capita income per annum. I conclude that Guinea-Bissau
most likely went through a change in regime in 1987, to become a country under a
monetary dominant regime.
5.2.1.2 The Floating Rate Countries
There are five countries in this group with a significant break year: Angola, DRC,
Gambia, Guinea, Mozambique. Table 56 contains their structural break results, and pvalues:
TABLE 54: FLOATING RATE COUNTRIES WITH A SIGNIFICANT BREAK YEAR
Countries

Year

Statistics

p-value

Angola

1997

151.41

0.0000

DRC

1995

109.73

0.0000

Gambia

1988

110.78

0.0000

Guinea

1987

27.61

0.0001

Mozambique

1988

15.84

0.022

The first four countries in the table above show that their break was very significant. I
study the first two countries together for reasons that I will give below. The other three I
study individually.

17

SDR stands for Special Drawing Rights. It was the result of the 1968 Rio De Janeiro agreement (Grubel,
1972). It is a form of international liquidity to supplement nations’ official reserve holdings of gold,
dollars, and IMF quotas.
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A) ANGOLA AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC)

The reason I analyze these two countries together is because they have a very similar
inflation history. Inflation in Angola follows the behavior of DRC’s inflation, but to a
lesser degree, and at a year-long lag. Figure 60 below shows this pattern.
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FIGURE 56: DRC AND ANGOLA’S INFLATION
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While the inflation in DRC reached a peak of about 24 thousand percent in 1994,
Angola’s reached a peak of around 4 thousand percent in 1996. The structural break test
identifies a significant break a year after each of those peaks: 1995 for DRC and 1997 for
Angola. A closer look at Figure 56 also shows that after an increase in price in DRC,
there is a similar one of lesser magnitude in Angola a year later. Looking at their history,
these two countries are not just similar in their inflation but also in the mineral resources
that they are known for, namely copper, gold, diamond, and cobalt. Additionally, both
countries had civil wars in the 1990s: Angola from 1975 to 2002, and DRC from 1997 to
1999 (Ross, 2004 p.14). Therefore, a parallel study of the two might give better insight
into the significance of their individual break years.
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The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) became independent in June of 1960
after seventy-five years of colonial rule by Belgium. Immediately following this
independence, civil turmoil and strong secessionist tendencies arose and exhausted fiscal
sources of revenue, forcing the government to rely on seigniorage. In a paper about this
country, Jean-Claude Nachega (2005) identifies DRC as a country under fiscal
dominance between 1981 and 2003, which is within the period under study in my thesis.
Between 1990 and 2000, the economy of DRC experienced changes that stemmed from
the political and social environment of the time. Early in the 1990s, there was
hyperinflation in the country, as shown in Figure 56. The president at the time, Mobutu
Sese Soko, announced that the country would move from a single-party system to a
multiparty democracy, after pressures from donors and political changes from Eastern
Europe. Additionally, the social pressures that ensued led to unprecedented fiscal
expansions. This situation was exacerbated when the country experienced an adverse
supply shock at the end of 1990. This shock resulted from a caving in at the Kamoto
copper mine belonging to Gecamines (the state-owned mining company), which pushed
the company to cut its output by 23 percent (Nachega 2005, p. 8). This caused the fiscal
deficit to increase further, and the government turned to money creation to finance it.
This worsened the situation, and plunged the country into a vicious cycle of
hyperinflation.
This inflation reached its peak in 1994, at about twenty-four thousand percent. In
early 1995, however, the government launched a disinflation program based on fiscal
consolidation and credit restraint (Nachega, 2005, p.8). While the program was
abandoned in the second half of that year because of increased political pressures,
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inflation decreased to about five hundred percent in 1995 and 1996. In 1997, after a sixmonth rebellion, Laurent-Desire Kabila became president and adopted strict fiscal and
monetary policies, and issued a new currency, the Congolese franc, in 1998. Inflation
dropped to double digits consequently, but jumped back up again between 1998 and 2001
when the president was assassinated, which split the country in two, with the government
controlling the south and west, and the rebels controlling most of the east and north.
Kabila’s son, Joseph Kabila, replaced his father, and announced his intention to
seek a peaceful end to the civil war, normalize relations with the international
community, introduce multiparty democracy, and liberalize the economy. Consequently,
the country negotiated an IMF Staff-Monitored Program aimed at restoring
macroeconomic stability. Additionally, steps were taken to restore the autonomy of the
Central Bank of Congo, and avoid excessive money creation. The results were positive;
the inflation rate slowly decreased as seen in Figure 56. It went from 357 percent in 2001,
to about 12 percent in 2003, and 4 percent the next year. While DRC has mostly been
under a fiscally dominant regime since its independence, after the disinflation program
launched by the government in 1995, the inflation has considerably dropped. In light of
this history, I conclude that DRC went from a fiscally dominant regime before the break
year (1995) to a monetary dominant one sometime after. However, the effects were not
observable in the years immediately after because of the political and social struggles that
the country experienced. When peace was restored, inflation dropped as the new regime
took full effect.
Southeast of DRC, a smaller country both in size and population, Angola, has
gone through the same inflation spikes. Since its independence from Portugal in 1975, the
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country has been ravaged by civil war that officially ended in 2002. After a long war of
liberation against their former colonial ruler, ideological and ethnical fractionalization,
along with the battle over natural resources, ignited a brutal war that caused the country’s
government to default on its debt in 1976, 1985, and 1992 through 2002 (Barros and GilAlana, 2013, p. 2). Angola’s inflation indicates a significant drop in 1997, which is also
the country’s structural break year. According to Barros and Gil-Alana, in 1996, a
restrictive monetary policy was put into effect which resulted in a decreased rate of
inflation. The authors also identify a single break year in August 1996. They use
quarterly data for their analysis, and therefore have a more accurate structural break year
than I do.
Aguilar describes Angolan policy making as a cycle of activity, passivity, and
crisis (Aguilar 2001, p. 10). When a crisis erupts, criticism by the president sparks a new
program that is presented to him by the Ministry of Planning at the beginning of the year.
The program contains a list of projects (activity) that have not been properly examined
because they are usually not feasible, not financeable, and have no social benefits. Of
those projects, only a few are executed, and most have very low social returns, and the
ones with high returns are usually shelved, or never completed (passivity). As a result,
the program is usually abandoned by the middle of the year, and policy-making becomes
paralyzed. The year ends with a deep financial crisis, and fresh criticism by the president.
Therefore, the reforms implemented in 1997, the structural break year, did not last long,
but were undermined by this cycle, which is why inflation remained in the triple digits
until the end of the war in 2002. Afterwards, it decreased, and reached single digits in
2013 and 2014. The result is that Angola’s deals with the IMF have suffered because the
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elite in the country are openly opposed to these deals. Aguilar notes that Angola is almost
unique among transition countries both in Africa and elsewhere in its limited borrowing
from the Fund. I conclude therefore, that the reason why the structural break is significant
is because of the considerable drop in inflation, and not because of the change in regime.
Angola was therefore under a fiscally dominant regime between 1980 and 2005.
B) GAMBIA

Gambia is the smallest country in Africa in terms of area. It is located in the west corner
of Africa between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau. It gained independence from the United
Kingdom in February 1965. It had only two leaders since its independence; the first was
Dawda Jawara, who ruled from 1970 until 1994, when the current leader Yahya Jammeh
seized power in a coup. The country went through a period of relatively high inflation
during the 1980s, but saw a considerable disinflation after 1986. Figure 61 contains the
inflation history of Gambia between 1980 and 2015.
FIGURE 57: INFLATION IN GAMBIA
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Groundnut is the main crop in Gambia. In the early 1970s, fertilizers began to be
widely used by farmers in the country. The Gambian Produce Marketing Board (GPMB)
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imported fertilizers and organized domestic handling while the Gambian Cooperative
Union (GCU) organized the retailing of fertilizer and gave credit to finance fertilizer
purchases through its cooperative societies. The system was built so as to have one
organization in charge from the GPMB to the GCU, and then to the farmers. However,
because of a managerial problem, the first fertilizer shipment of 19 thousand tons,
supposedly covering the total demand of the country for the year, did not arrive in time
for the 1985 cultivation season (Von Braun and Puetz, 1987). This disruption of fertilizer
had a considerable impact on the country’s production of groundnut, hence the increase
in prices that ensued the following year.
Along with an overvalued exchange rate, price controls, and overexpansion of the
public sector, Gambia went through a severe economic crisis during that decade (Sriram,
2009). In June 1985, however, the authorities implemented a comprehensive adjustment
program, the Economic Recovery Program (ERP), followed by the Program for Sustained
Development in 1990. Therefore, while it is not possible to determine whether there was
a change in regime (from monetary to fiscal, or vice versa) during this period, it is
certainly evident that the changes that were made had a significant, and positive impact
on the country’s economic outlook.
The structural break year of Gambia is 1988, and it is also very significant. A look
at Figure 57 shows that after 1986, the year with the highest rate, there was a
considerable drop, from above 55 percent in 1986 to less than 15 percent in 1988. The
high inflation observed in the mid-1980s coincides with this fertilizer crisis, which
lowered income and output. In January 1986, Gambia adhered to a managed floating
exchange rate regime. Until then, the dalasi (Gambia’s currency) was pegged to the
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pound sterling at a rate of D5=£1 (Sriram, 2009). I conclude that the country most likely
entered a monetary dominant regime after the crisis and the ensuing adjustment
programs.
C) GUINEA

Guinea is the next country in Table 56 with a significant structural break year. The
structural break year is 1987. A look at inflation in Guinea makes sense of this result.
Figure 42 graphs inflation in Guinea between 1980 and 2005.
FIGURE 58: INFLATION IN GUINEA
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Blavy (2004) describes Guinea’s inflation experience as being divided in three distinctive
periods. After its independence in 1958, inflation remained subdued at between 5 to 10
percent for the first two decades. This period is not shown in the figure above because it
is before the period of my study, but is described by Blavy as a period of administrative
control of prices. However, after 1979, and for a decade, the country went through a
period of high inflation. This is the second period identified by Blavy. Lastly, a period of
disinflation followed during which the consumer price index decreased until 2003, the
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last period in Blavy’s study. From the figure above however, there is another period of
inflation that follows, but lower than the one in 1986.
The hyperinflation period started in 1979, and was due to a partial economic
liberalization accompanied by significant imbalances, and loose monetary policy,
combined with weak supply responses, according to Blavy (2004, p.5). A reform program
followed a coup, which resulted in a surge of inflation that culminated in an annual
average inflation rate of about 65 percent in 1986. Additionally, the national currency
was devalued by 92 percent, trade was liberalized, and price controls were removed,
except those on fuel and rice. The structural break year that I detect is during the
disinflation period when the prices began to decrease. According to Blavy, this period of
disinflation was supported by favorable climactic conditions leading to very significant
increases in agricultural output and food production. These changes were followed by
low prices and increases in food products and basic commodities such as housing and
transport. The exchange rate also stabilized, and imported prices declined. Blavy argues
that the declining trend in inflation was largely because of the relative stability of
monetary policy. Broad money growth was limited, bank credit to the government was
contained, and the level of net foreign assets remained adequate. I conclude with these
aggregates that there is a change in regime after 1987. It is very likely that after 1987,
Guinea switched to a monetary dominant regime, from the description given by Blavy.
D) MOZAMBIQUE

Mozambique is one of only six countries in Africa that has Portuguese as its official
language. After its independence in 1975, it was plagued by civil war from 1976 until
1992. A peace agreement was reached in October 1992 by the two parties at war: Frelimo
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(Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique) and Renamo-Uniao Eleitoral. Figure 59 shows the
inflation rate in Mozambique between 1980 and 2015.
FIGURE 59: INFLATION IN MOZAMBIQUE
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Before the end of the war, inflation was high, with its peak in 1987 of about 164
percent. The structural break test detects a significant change in 1988. According to GilAlana et al. (2014), in order to counteract the disastrous economic situation that resulted
from the civil war, the government of Mozambique introduced a comprehensive marketoriented ‘Economic Rehabilitation Programme’ (ERP) in 1987, with the assistance of the
IMF and the World Bank. Later in 1989, the reform effort was renamed ‘Economic and
Social Rehabilitation Programme’ (ESRP). As a result of these reforms, the authors argue
that the macroeconomic landscape of Mozambique was characterized by the second
highest increase in the growth rate of real GDP among nonoil exporting countries in the
sub-Saharan region. The fact that disinflation and these reforms happened at the same
time is therefore not coincidental. I conclude that there was a change in regime in this
country as well. I would argue that while the break year is 1988, the effects of the change
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in regime were not observable until after the war, hence the drop in the inflation rate after
1995. The country switched to a monetary dominant regime.

5.2.2 Countries with an Insignificant Break Year
This last section is made up of countries with no significant break year. There are
14 countries in this group. Most of them are in the CFA zone (9 countries), which makes
sense because of the monetary benefit of a monetary union. However, I would argue that
most of these countries are very likely in the non-identified regime category, with an
impulse response that is indicative of a monetary dominant regime, but a negative
correlation between surpluses. The reason is that the monetary union only ensures the
discipline of the central bank, and not that of the government. In other words, the
monetary institution is not the only determinant of a monetary dominant regime. The
central bank must work in conjunction with the government to ensure that fiscal policies
are sustainable. It does not appear to be the case for these countries in Africa. I would use
the same argument for the rest of the countries in this group. In fact, I would classify
them as in non-identified regimes, with a positive impulse response, because they are not
in a monetary union, which means that the central bank does not have the accountability
that a monetary union brings. Table 53 contains the list of countries in this group as well
as their statistics, p-values, and exchange rate regimes.
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TABLE 55: COUNTRIES WITH NO SIGNIFICANT BREAK YEAR
Countries

Estimated break
year

Statistic

p-value

Exchange rate Regime

Benin

1995

3.19

0.9753

CFA

Burkina Faso

1994

2.87

0.9881

CFA

Central African Rep.

1986

4.1438

0.9018

CFA

Chad

1987

3.82

0.9323

CFA

Congo

1994

2.52

0.9964

CFA

Gabon

1995

4.52

0.8608

CFA

Ivory Coast

1998

1.54

1.00

CFA

Niger

1994

4.29

0.8866

CFA

Senegal

1986

5.65

0.7114

CFA

Burundi

1998

12.35

0.0907

Others

Comoros

1994

4.37

0.8778

Others

Cape Verde

1987

7.2785

0.487

Others

Madagascar

1998

6.29

0.6218

Others

Sao Tome & Principe

1998

9.74

0.2312

Others
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Chapter 6: Conclusion and Recommendations
6.1 Conclusion
It is true that inflation is a monetary phenomenon, as Friedman argued. But as I
have shown in my thesis, an undisciplined fiscal authority can also cause inflation by the
impact of the surplus on liabilities. Research in the fiscal theory of the price level has
revealed that inflation can be explained by a process other than the quantity theory of
money. In fact, my thesis adds to the empirical literature that demonstrate that inflation in
many developing economies can be explained. On the other hand, in advanced
economies, the distinction between a fiscal and a monetary dominant regime is usually
clearly defined; although the case of the US immediately after World War II, and before
the Accord, seems to suggest that even a developed economy may find itself in a nonidentified regime, or period of transition. In developing countries however, the empirical
evidence of the fiscal theory of the price level seems to be increasing. In my thesis, I
show that this theory holds true in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa.
Following the work of Baldini and Ribeiro (2008), who classifies SSA countries
as either under a monetary or a fiscally dominant regime between 1980 and 2005, I
reproduce their work but add to it. They suggest at the end of their study that testing these
SSA countries for a structural break year could further add to the empirical literature on
the FTPL. In other words, because Africa is known for political, social, and economic
turmoil, it is very likely that they have experienced regime switcsh since their
independence. I use Baldini and Ribeiro’s data and run a structural break test on inflation
data on all the SSA countries that they use. I conclude that countries such as Kenya had a
significant break year in 1994, and went from a monetary dominant regime before that
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year to a fiscally dominant regime after it. But when Ribeiro and Baldini studied Kenya,
they only found the second part of my result. Thus, they identified it as a fiscally
dominant regime. My thesis therefore identified regime switches within their data.
On the other hand, for countries that did not have a significant break year, I only
reproduced the VAR analysis of Ribeiro and Baldini, to ensure that my results matched
theirs. Whenever, the break year was significant, but I could not run a VAR analysis, as
in the case of Equatorial Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, I used history to argue for one
regime or another. In each case, the significant year coincided with a major event, either
political (DRC’s change in president in 1997), monetary (Equatorial Guinea joining the
CFA zone in 1985), or social (the end of the civil war in Mozambique in 1992).

6.2 Recommendation
This study could be used for policy decisions in those African countries that are in
non-identified regimes. A monetary dominant regime usually signifies that the central
bank is independent, which is a step in the right direction, even though it does not
necessarily mean that the country’s economy is growing or that inflation is low and
stable. An example of this is Cameroon, a country with a monetary dominant regime, and
yet still classified as a third world country. Countries under a fiscally dominant regime
are historically more likely to have higher inflation because they tend to resort to money
creation to finance their deficit. Therefore, this study could guide those countries to make
better monetary decisions, such as central bank independence, or to be more fiscally
disciplined. Additionally, having used history to argue for a change in regime, the impact
of the IMF and the World Bank is unmistakable. With the economic programs that these
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institutions, SSA countries could use a lesson from history and adhere, or implement
those program, because they seem to have brought about economic reforms.

6.3 Direction for future research
In conclusion, while this study used a period from 1980 to 2005, it would be
interesting to know if anything has changed since then. As I mentioned in the chapter 4,
inflation in most countries was falling. Therefore, it is possible that some of these
countries, especially those with a non-identified regime, have switched to a new regime
by. Most advanced economies have a monetary dominant regime, which means that the
central bank is independent. Additionally, fiscal policies are sustainable, meaning that
they always satisfy their intertemporal budget constraint through adjustment of the
budget deficit; put differently, the fiscal authority is passive, while the monetary authority
is active. Therefore, a similar study with updated data would give a sense as to whether
SSA countries have made an effort to copy these traits of developed-country central
banks, in order to diminish the income gap between advanced and developing economies.
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